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Abstract 
During the recent financial crisis, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the FDIC) 
auctioned most of the failed banks. A distinguishing character of these failed bank auctions is 
that the failed banks are sold at discount from the most recent quarter valuation of their reported 
asset value. A second distinguishing feature of these auctions is that acquirers of these failed 
banks have frequently reported bargain purchase gain (BPG) compared to regular mergers during 
the same period. Based on a unique sample of the FDIC-assisted whole-bank transactions in the 
recent financial crisis, we measure discount using accounting information, investigate what 
factors lead to larger discount and larger reporting of BPGs, and further examine the effects of 
discount on the post-merger performance of the acquiring institutions. Consistent with prior 
literature, we identify bidding competitiveness and loss sharing agreement as significant 
determinants. However, DIF reserve ratio, the proxy for the financial condition of the FDIC and 
relative size between the failed bank and the acquirer, are not found to have significant and 
consistent relation with discount. As expected, we document that discount can inflate the post-
merger profitability of acquirers. Overall, our study provides insights about the intrinsic 
connection between the discount determinants and the features of the FDIC-assisted failed bank 
resolution. 
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1. Introduction 
The most recent financial crisis witnessed another tide of bank failures since the last failure wave 
during early 1980s and early 1990s (see Figure B.1). According Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (the FDIC), 463 out of 489 failed banks were resolved by purchase and assumption 
(P&A) transactions (see Figure B.2). In a P&A transaction, a selected pool of potential bidders 
are invited by the FDIC to participate in a sealed-bid auction and the winning bidder purchases 
part of or all assets and assumes part of or all liabilities of the failing bank. The winning bid is 
chosen on a least-cost basis for the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF).   
INSERT FIGURE B.1 AND FIGURE B.2 HERE 
 
Besides the features such as less competitive bidding environment, the special roles of the FDIC 
as both insurer and partner, and the limited time structure of resolution process, the FDIC-
assisted P&A auction is characterized as acquiring institution buying failed banks at a discount in 
most cases
1
, in contrast to the overpayment in a regular bank or corporate merger. A 
predominant explanation of overpayment in regular merger is explained by ‘winner’s curse’, 
which states that the winning bidder in a sealed-bid auction tends to be the one most 
overestimating the intrinsic value of the auctioned object, thus being “cursed” in a way of paying 
more than the target worth.  
The source and effect of the unique “discount” phenomenon in the FDIC-assisted failed bank 
resolution is the focus of our study. Our primary objectives are to measure the magnitude of 
discount, investigate how the discount is determined, and examine its effect on the post-merger  
                                                          
1
 In our sample, discount happens in 95.96% of the whole-bank P&A transaction. 
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performance of the acquirers. Our sample consists of 99 whole-bank P&A transactions from the 
fourth quarter of 2009 to the first quarter of 2013
2
.  
In our study, the definition of discount
3
 is the difference between the transaction price and the 
fair value of the failed bank at the time of the merger. The estimation of discount is based on the 
equity value of the failed bank at the time of merger based on accounting information, with 
adjustments of deposit premium, asset discounts (or premium in some cases), we also recalculate 
discount using bank equity capital two quarters prior to the failure for robustness. We report an 
average discount relative to the failed bank total liabilities of 15.13% by method 1 and 16.57% 
by method 2. 
We analyse what determines discount in a failed bank merger. We propose that if the abnormal 
return is associated with discount or wealth transfer, as implied in the prior literatures (James and 
Wier 1987, Bertin, Ghanzanfari and Torbzadeh 1989, Cochrane, Rose and Fraser 1995, Zhang 
1997, Cowan and Salotti 2015), we expect that some of those factors also impact discount. 
Factors of interest in our study include financial condition of the FDIC, bidding competitiveness, 
relative size of the failed bank to the acquirer, the usage of loss sharing agreement. Geographic 
factors are used as control variables, including whether the failed bank and the acquirer are 
located in the same city (or state) and the unemployment rate of the state where the failed bank is 
located. 
Christoffersen et al. (2012) argues that the financial pressure of the FDIC signaled by the large 
outflows of DIF contributes to large and long-lasting abnormal returns for the acquirer around 
the merger announcement. Using DIF reserve ratio as the proxy for the financial condition of the 
FDIC, we fail to find empirical evidence of the connection between the financial stress of the 
FDIC and the discount offered by the FDIC to the acquirer.  
Bidding competitiveness, indicated by number of bids, is found to negatively impact discount. A 
series of literatures document that bidding competitiveness makes a difference in post-merger 
abnormal returns (James and Weir 1987a/1987b, Gupta et al. 1997, Stover 1997, Christoffersen 
et al. 2012). Our results show that less bidding competitiveness leads to higher discount, and it 
                                                          
2
 Our sample is different from previous studies that did not distinguish between partial and the whole-bank P&A 
transactions.  
3
 In some rare cases, we observe a premium rather than discount. 
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explains the significant discounts observed in our sample to some extent. The results for bidding 
competitiveness remains consistent in all robustness tests, except in robustness test 3 where 
bidding competitiveness shows no significance for the second sub-period. The significant results 
for bidding competitiveness may be explained by the fact that our sample covers the period of an 
industry-wide crisis, resulting in a less competitive bidding environment. Additionally, the 
screening for qualified participants in the closed-form auction further limits bidding 
competitiveness.  
Size is an important factor in merger since larger target size may result in higher synergy, 
economies of scale and lower transaction costs. However, larger target during financial crisis 
may also become problematic to resolve for the FDIC and unaffordable for survivor banks.  The 
relative size turns out to be significantly and positively related to discount level, consistent with 
Christoffersen et al. (2012). However, after excluding extreme cases in which the relative size is 
larger than or equal to two, we do not find significant relationship between relative size and 
discount. 
Besides calculating discount directly from accounting information, we also use bargaining 
purchase gain (BPG) reported by the acquiring institutions to indirectly reflect discount. Under 
the current accounting standard, BPG is required to be reported in income statement within one 
year after a merger, in which the target is sold at a price less than its fair value. We document 
that the acquirers in the FDIC-assisted acquisitions on average not only report higher BPGs than 
the acquirers in the non-FDIC-assisted acquisitions but also report BPGs more frequently. In our 
empirical analysis of the determinant of the BPG, we find that only bidding competitiveness, 
among the earlier tested factors turns out to be significant. In addition, our findings from the 
FDIC-assisted-merger sample do not support Dunn et al. (2015), which argues that acquirers 
experiencing earnings decline are more likely to report BPGs.  
Finally, we examine the effect of discount on the post-merger profitability improvements of the 
acquirer. We find that larger discount is associated with short-term profitability improvements 
after the merger. The reason for us to focus on profitability improvement is that it may arise from 
post-merger synergy effect or underestimation of assets (equity). An acquirer who over-discounts 
the assets of failed bank creates artificially inflated profitability indicators (return on assets and 
return on equity) since the denominators are underestimated.  
4 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the previous literatures 
of the FDIC-assisted failed bank. Chapter 3 describes the development of our hypotheses. In 
chapter 4, we discuss our methods of measuring discounts and our empirical approaches to 
analyze the determinants and effects of discount. Chapter 5 presents the sources, filtering process 
and features of our data and variables. Chapter 6 shows our empirical results. Finally, chapter 7 
concludes.
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 FDIC Failed Banks Resolution 
The involvement of the FDIC has made the FDIC-assisted mergers and acquisitions unique in 
terms of both resolution process and the special post-merger arrangements. In spite of the 
changes of the precise resolution manner over time, the basic contour has remained constant 
since the foundation of FDIC, according to Chritofferson et al. (2012). 
 
Regulatory Background 
Aiming to improve the safety and soundness of both the banking and thrift industries, the FDIC 
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) requires the least-cost resolution of insured depository 
institutions, enhanced supervision and examinations of insured institutions and additional 
resources to the Bank Insurance Fund
4
.  
Before 1991, the FDIC could choose any resolution transaction less costly than a deposit payoff 
while taking the effects of other resolution methods into account.  After the pass of FDICIA in 
1991, the FDIC amended its failure resolution procedures to accept the “least cost” bid. The least 
cost procedures require the FDIC to choose the resolution method in which the total amount of 
the FDIC’s expenditures and liabilities incurred (including any immediate or long-term 
obligation and any direct or contingent liability) has the lowest cost to the DIF, regardless of 
other factors
5
. 
Another main overarching provision of FDICIA is “prompt corrective action”, which requires 
federal banking agencies to take progressively severe, corrective, supervisory actions as a bank’s 
capital condition deteriorates. The failing banks can either re-capitalize or voluntarily arrange a 
merger with another bank.
                                                          
4
 Source: https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/8000-2400.html
   
 
5
 The only exception is if there is a finding of “systemic” problems affecting the financial marketplace. 
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Shortly after FDICIA, the Riegle Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 
(RNIBBEA) further exerted important influence on banking industry. RNIBBEA removed the 
legal barriers for bank holding companies to branch across state lines, resulting in massive 
consolidation and concentration in banking industry over the past 20 years.
 
Prior to the 
RNIBBEA, the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 prohibited the 
interstate acquisition unless specifically authorized by the laws of
 
the state where the target bank 
was located. 
 
 
Failed Bank Resolution Process 
Under FDICIA and other current laws, once a bank is determined by the chartering agency to be 
insolvent, critically undercapitalized, or unable to meet deposit outflows, the failing bank is 
allowed 90 days to take prompt corrective actions. Failing to recapitalize or find a suitable buyer 
within the 90-day period leads to a formal resolution process by the FDIC.   
There are three basic resolution methods for FDIC when facing failed and failing institutions: 
deposit payoff, open bank assistance (OBA) agreement, and purchase assumption (P&A) 
agreement. On rare occasions, the FDIC pays off the full amount of the insured deposits within 
the insurance limit
6
 or provides financial assistance
7
 to an operating insured bank determined to 
be in danger of closing, known as deposit payoff and OBA
8
, respectively. The P&A agreement is 
a closed bank transaction in which a healthy institution (the acquirer) purchases some or all of 
the assets of a failed bank and assumes some or all of
 
the liabilities, including all insure deposits
9
. 
The acquirer usually pays a premium for the assumed deposits and/or receives a discount on the 
                                                          
6
 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 permanently increased the deposit 
insurance into $250,000 from $100,000per depositor for each account ownership category. 
7
 Financial assistance of FDIC includes making loan to, purchasing the assets of, or placing deposits in the troubled 
bank. This method has not been used since 1992. 
8
 OBA is in the forms of direct loans, contributions, deposits, asset purchases, or the assumption of liabilities. Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010 eliminated this option. 
6
 The definition and the process of P&A agreement are based on: Chapter 2, Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and 
RTC Experience, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/history1-02.pdf 
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assets purchased.
 
During the recent financial crisis, the vast majority of failed banks were 
resolved by P&A agreement. 
Before the P&A transaction, the FDIC performs a series of task, including processing the failing 
bank letter sent by the chartering agency, developing an information package for potential 
bidders, performing an asset valuation calculating the cost of a deposit payoff, determining the 
appropriate resolution structure, conducting an on-site analysis and selecting the eligible bidders 
based on specific factors
10
. After getting the information package distributed on an information 
session and signing a confidentiality agreement, the eligible bidders do their own due diligence 
and interested bidders submit bids in a sealed-bid auction. A bid has three parts: a bid on deposits, 
a bid on the assets, and whether they bid on all the deposits or only insured deposits. The 
winning bid is selected under the principle of least cost. Cash is the only acceptable payment 
method. The entire process of the auction should be kept confidential by all parties until the 
FDIC officially makes the announcement. The disclosed bid summary includes the name as well 
as the bid amount of the winning bidder and those of the losing bidders, but in a manner that de-
links losing bidders’ names from their bid amounts. The losing bids are disclosed days or weeks 
after the announcement of the winning bid, while the cover bid (the second highest bid) is 
disclosed one year after
11
. 
 
Resolution Costs for the FDIC  
FDICIA of 1991 requires the FDIC to select the least-cost resolution method to the DIF. Factors 
influencing the cost of resolving failed banks to the FDIC have drawn attention of researchers 
since then. James (1991) documented substantial direct costs associated with bank failure (10 
percent of the failed bank assets), which is proven to be larger than the direct costs of 
nonfinancial firms bankruptcy. In addition, whole bank transactions, in which case all of a failed 
bank’s assets are sold to the acquirers, can significantly reduce losses since results show that 
more volume of assets assumed by the purchaser leads to significantly less losses on failed bank 
assets. Exploring the relationship between the reporting requirements of the failed bank and the 
                                                          
10
 Factors taken into consideration include: geographic location, competitive environment, asset size, capital level, 
ratings, and overall financial condition. Eligible bidders must be approved by their regulators to bid on the failed 
bank. 
11
 Source: https://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/biddocs.html 
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outcomes of the auction, Granja (2013) found evidence that stricter disclosure requirements 
corresponds to lower estimated costs of closing a bank and higher percentage of assets sold in the 
auctions. Using a longer-period sample from 1986 to 2007, Bennett and Unal (2015) 
demonstrated that the resolution costs differ among different methods of resolution, bank size, 
and regulatory periods. More specifically, P&A transactions are proven to cost more during 
crisis period than non-crisis period. The authors also find some components of resolution costs as 
well as the total costs have an inverse relationship with failed bank size.  
The effect of FDICIA on cost reduction of bank failures is examined by some recent papers, 
which show that FDICIA has been working successfully before the pre-2008 period. Bennett and 
Unal (2014, 2015) found that costs of private-sector reorganizations are significantly higher, 
compared to the costs of FDIC liquidations, in the banking crisis period of 1986 – 1991. But 
when focusing on the post-crisis period of 1992 – 2007, they found that private-sector 
reorganizations are inherently more cost effective than FDIC liquidation after controlling for the 
selection bias embedded in the resolution process. Besides the effect on resolution costs of failed 
banks, FDICIA is found to make supervisory interventions more effective at banks (Kane et al. 
2008), and to improve the quality of bank financial reporting (Altamuro and Beatty 2010). 
 
Loss Sharing Arrangement
12 
Loss sharing is a feature that the FDIC first introduced into selected P&A transactions in 1991. 
The original goals were to (1) sell as many assets as possible to the acquiring bank and (2) have 
the nonperforming assets managed and collected by the acquiring bank in a manner that aligned 
the interests and incentives of the acquiring bank and the FDIC. Loss sharing applies to two 
categories of bank assets, commercial assets and residential mortgages.  
Under loss sharing, the FDIC agrees to absorb a significant portion of the loss – typically 80% - 
on a specified pool of assets while offering even greater loss protection in the event of financial 
catastrophe, and the acquiring bank is liable for the remaining portion of the loss. On occasion of 
                                                          
12
 This section is based on FDIC document: https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/history1-07.pdf 
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recoveries on assets that have been charged off by the failed bank or the acquirer, the FDIC will 
gain 80% of the benefit while the acquiring bank gains the 20%. Before March 26, 2010, loss 
sharing is allowed to be on a 95/5 basis when the losses exceeded an established threshold 
defined in loss sharing agreement. The loss sharing agreement stipulates what the assuming 
institution can and cannot do with the acquired loans. For example, the acquirer can only sell the 
acquired loans after a certain period of time and even then only with the FDIC’s approval. 
The loss sharing is favorable for the following reasons. Firstly, it helps the FDIC minimize 
outlays and reduce immediate funding needs. Secondly, it keeps assets in the private sector 
instead of under government management. From the perspective of the acquirers, loss sharing 
protects the acquiring banks from losses. Most importantly, it helps local consumers and 
businesses by keeping the assets of the failed bank in the community, preserving banking 
relationships for customers who have both deposits and loans in the failed bank. On the other 
hand, the disadvantages lie in the facts that loss sharing requires additional administrative duties 
for both the acquirer and the FDIC and that it’s time-consuming as agreements generally last 8 to 
10 years
13
. 
The loss sharing agreement is bundled with the auctioned assets rather than priced separately. 
Given the insurance function of loss sharing, it encourages acquirers to bid higher and accept 
lower discount on failed bank assets. If the loss sharing agreement is underpriced, there will be 
more interested potential buyers. Therefore, one way that the FDIC could subsidize the acquirer 
is by underpricing the loss sharing agreement. 
 
Bargain Purchase Gain  
Issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in December 2007, a revised 
standard of accounting and reporting in business combinations requires the Bargain Purchase 
Gains (BPGs), previously known as “negative goodwill”, to be reported within income statement 
                                                          
13
 For commercial assets, the loss sharing agreement covers an eight-year period with the first five years for losses 
and recoveries and the final three years for recoveries only. For single-family mortgages, the loss sharing agreement 
is for ten years.  
Source: FDIC website – Industry Analysis – Failed Banks – Loss-share Questions and Answers 
      
10 
 
from continuing operations, effective from January 1, 2009
14
. A bargain purchase occurs when 
the price paid by the acquiring institution is lower than the fair value of the failed bank and it 
“might happen in a business combination that is a forced sale in which the seller is acting under 
compulsion” (FASB 2007, para. 37). Before a P&A auction, very limited information about the 
failing bank is revealed in the information package distributed by the FDIC to potential bidders. 
Furthermore, the whole resolution process takes about 90 days and the time period from the 
FDIC contacting potential bidders to the completion of the transaction only lasts about 8 weeks 
according to Dunn et al. (2015), hence bidders may not obtain all necessary information to 
accurately were allowed to write down the amount of negative goodwill on a pro-rata basis to 
designated asset classes, with the residual negative goodwill recorded as an extraordinary gain. 
By comparison, the impact of the accounting revision is apparently a boost in earnings and thus 
retained earnings. The new standard requires the price difference to be recognized as a gain in 
earnings within the 12 months after the acquisition time.  
Designed to “improve the representational faithfulness and completeness of the information 
provided about the acquirers earnings during the period in which it makes a bargain purchase”, 
acknowledged in FASB (2007), the revised standard is found to reveal favorable results 
empirically. Using a sample of 142 FDIC-assisted bank acquisitions during 2009 and 2010, 
Dunn, Kohlbeck and Smith (2015) reports that BPG is used by firms to prevent losses and 
earning/return on assets declines, which provides a contemporaneous opportunity of earnings 
management. More specifically, evidences show that public banks with pre-acquisition earnings 
declines are more likely to report a BPG; in contrast, the results for their non-public counterparts 
turn out to be insignificant. Another important finding is that the 5-day cumulative abnormal 
return for acquisitions with BPG announced is on average 4.53%, compared with 0.02% for 
acquisitions with no BPG announced. Further, the cumulative abnormal return, found to be less 
persistent, is identified as a transitory component of current income. However, an earlier study 
by Comiskey, Clarke, and Mulford (2010) failed to document that negative goodwill is valued by 
the market. Their sample consists of 43 acquisitions with negative goodwill during 2000 and 
2007, including companies from different industries. 
 
                                                          
14
 Source: FASB ASC 850-30-25-2 
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2.2 Market Reaction to Failed Bank Acquirers and Corresponding Reasons  
 
Negative Abnormal Returns - Overbidding / Winner’s Curse Theory 
A few papers in 1980s found negative abnormal returns of the acquirers, suggesting the existence 
of overbidding behavior in FDIC failed bank auctions. Pettway and Trifts (1985) documented 
that the market for failed banks is competitive and the acquiring banks may have bid more than 
the competitive price, since there was significant decline in abnormal return. 
Examining the effects of bidder competition within the context of FDIC auctions of failed banks, 
Giliberto and Varaiya (1989) found supportive evidence of winner’s curse. This finding 
contradicts the critical prediction regarding optimal bidder behavior in common value models. 
However, their results are consistent with optimal bidder behavior if P&A transactions are 
Independent private values (IPV) auctions. 
 
Positive Abnormal Returns - Underbidding/ Wealth Transfer Effect 
Another stream of the empirical studies show positive abnormal returns of the purchasers, 
supporting the hypothesis of underbidding behavior of bidders, that is, the FDIC winners on 
average pay less for failed bank assets than they worth. Underbidding allows the acquirers to 
expropriate wealth from the FDIC and it hinders the identification of the sources of positive 
abnormal returns. 
As one of the early researches in this field, James and Wier (1987b) tested wealth transfers 
hypothesis by examining the returns to winning bidders in FDIC auctions. They found positive 
abnormal returns to winning bidders and, more importantly, a negative and significant relation 
between the returns to winning bidders and the number of bidders participating in the auction, 
which suggests that the FDIC’s auction procedures generate wealth transfers from the FDIC to 
the acquiring banks. 
Besides the procedures of the FDIC P&A auction, another macro-economic factor is the 
changing banking environment. Using the sample from 1982 to 1987, Bertin et al. (1989) 
reported that acquiring banks capture significant positive abnormal returns over the period just 
12 
 
prior to and including the failure/merger announcement date, implying that underbidding is being 
practiced by successful acquirers. The authors attributed the result to the rapidly-changing 
banking environment of the 1980s. The sharp increase in bank failures, which resulted from 
factors like banking deregulation, high and volatile interest rates and poor lending practices, 
caused the failed bank auction participants to be more conservative in their bidding practices. In 
another aspect, the bargaining power of bidders has become stronger due to the increased supply 
of failed banks auctioned by the FDIC and the restrictions in the FDIC’s sealed bid invitations. 
Moreover, regulatory factors such as the removal of some restrictions on intrastate and interstate 
branching have provided banks with more expansion alternatives, thereby reducing the 
attractiveness of failed bank acquisitions.  
Furthermore, some studies focused on the three parties involving in P&A transactions, the failed 
bank, the acquirer and the FDIC. From the respect of the failed bank, Cochran et al. (1995) 
showed that acquiring banks’ undertaking large failed bank transactions experienced large 
wealth transfers. The authors claimed that the excess returns are not driven by scale or scope 
economies, but may be explained by the synergy hypothesis and over subsidization hypothesis.  
From the aspect of the acquirer, the experience and ability of the acquirer significantly impact 
the abnormal returns. Bertin et al. (1989) argued that the increase in FDIC auctions enabled the 
bidding banks to improve their expertise in evaluating failed targets. This experience effect is 
also documented by Zhang (1997), which reported that significant cumulative abnormal returns 
of the FDIC-assisted acquisitions are driven by repeated acquirers, who improved its profiting 
chances by reducing the winning bid and the number of bids. In addition, Cowan and Salotti 
(2015) reported that the acquirer stock-price reaction is a decreasing function of its bid, which is 
further a decreasing function of the ability of healthy banks.   
From the aspect of the FDIC, Christoffersen et al. (2012) tested the hypothesis that the financial 
health of the FDIC limits its ability to efficiently resolve failed banks using a far larger sample 
than available in previous studies and found that acquirers experience large and long-lasting 
abnormal returns around the announcement of a failed bank acquisition when the DIF is 
experiencing large outflows, after remove the possible effects of positive information or changes 
in the competitiveness of bidding. 
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Positive Abnormal Returns - Synergy Effect 
The significant positive post-merger abnormal returns can also be explained by synergy effect, 
arising from improvement of operating efficiency and profitability performance. A number of 
studies have been conducted and results are significant both statistically and economically. 
Empirical studies have found that operating efficiency improvement, such as cost reduction and 
employee productivity enhancement, makes up a major part of the positive abnormal returns. 
Cornett and Tehranian (1992) found supportive evidence showing that the improvement in cash 
flow performance is due to enhanced ability to attract loans and deposits, optimized employee 
productivity and improved asset growth. Expectation of these factors is reflected in the post-
merger stock price. Focusing on the mergers and acquisitions in the European Union financial 
industry during the period 1998-2002, Campa and Hernando (2006) failed to find significantly 
different from zero excess returns of the acquiring banks but this paper found significant 
improvements in the acquiring bank performance beginning on average 2 years after the 
transaction was completed. Moreover, the target firms experience improvement in return on 
equity and efficiency. Going one step further, Houston et al. (2001) identified that cost savings 
contribute even more than revenue enhancement to the value creation, based on a sample of the 
largest bank mergers between 1985 and 1996. 
More often, improvements in profitability and operating efficiency work together. DeLong and 
DeYoung (2007) claimed that the chosen performance proxies (profitability indicators and 
operating efficiency indicators) indicated a significant improvement for the post-merger 
performance. Consistent with DeLong and DeYoung (2007), Al-Sharkas et al. (2008) also 
showed that bank mergers help to improve cost and profit efficiencies by increasing technology 
efficiency(i.e. the merged banks have access to the most efficient technology available) and 
allocative efficiency (i.e. the merged banks can use a cost minimizing input mix)
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3. Hypothesis Development 
In this chapter, we develop three sets of hypotheses regarding the determinants of the discount in 
the FDIC-assisted acquisitions, discount reflected by BPG, and the effects of the discount on the 
post-merger performance of acquirers. 
 
3.1 What Factors Impact Discount?  
Contrast to the “winner’s curse” suffered by the winning bidders in normal merger, the prevalent 
existence of discounted target price in the FDIC P&A transactions can be observed in bid 
summaries and the costs to the DIF disclosed in the press release.  
Wealth transfer, a similar concept of discount used in the previous literatures, has been 
documented and factors such as competitiveness of bidding, environment in banking industry, 
size of targets, experience of bidders, ability of acquirers and bargaining power of the FDIC are 
identified as relevant elements to impact wealth transfer based on different sampling periods and 
sample compositions. However, interpretation of wealth transfer is mainly derived from the post-
merger abnormal returns of acquirers. We propose to calculate the discount from accounting 
information directly and test if the factors mentioned earlier also play a role in determining the 
discount. 
The environment in banking industry during financial crisis period is featured as large supply of 
failed banks, increasing financial pressure of the FDIC and weak demand from survivor banks to 
buy a failed bank due to the high-risk nature of this type of mergers or simply due to the 
incapability of the survivor banks. Given that the FDIC’s deposit insurance fund (DIF) had a  
deficit around the third quarter of 2009 (see Figure B.3), it is reasonable to believe the incentive 
for the FDIC to over-subsidize the acquiring institutions in order to resolve the large amount of
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failed banks in a timely manner. In practice, the FDIC provides subsidies by accepting bid lower 
than the fair value as long as it satisfies as the with least cost transaction. 
Following Christoffersen et al. (2012), we use DIF Reserve Ratio, defined as the DIF balance 
divided by estimated insured deposits
15
, to proxy for the financial condition of the FDIC. If the 
financial pressure of the FDIC makes a major reason for discount, we would expect to see: 
H1: DIF reserve ratio should negatively affect discount. 
INSERT FIGURE B.3 HERE 
 
Competition increases the winning bid, narrowing the difference between winning bid and the 
intrinsic value of target. James and Wier (1987b) argue that competition reduces the wealth 
transfer from the FDIC to acquirers for FDIC assisted mergers. Bidders, with different target 
value estimations, have the incentive to bid lower than their estimated fair price, especially 
during a period of large supply of failed banks. As potential bidders become more experienced at 
value estimation of failed bank valuation and bidding it created an environment for them to 
expropriate wealth from the FDIC. Several elements contribute to the less competitive bidding 
environment during our sampling period. First, the screening process leaves only a selected pool 
of participants in the P&A auction. Second, our sample only consists of whole-bank transactions, 
which require the potential acquirers to be more financially-sound. Third, this type of 
transactions is inherent with high risk, thus making potential buyers reluctant to bid. The above 
factors results in lower bid price from their estimated fair value even in the presence of multiple 
bidders. Thus the higher-than-normal discounts we observed during the financial crisis a result of 
less competition: 
H2: Discount is negatively related to bidding competitiveness. 
 
                                                          
15
 Source of Definition: FDIC website https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance 
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Another aspect to consider is the size of failed bank, which may have mixed effects on discount. 
On one hand, the size of failed bank can positively impact bidding price by potentially 
generating larger post-merger synergy. A failed bank with larger customer base and more market 
share is more likely to facilitate profitability and cost efficiency enhancements, making the target 
more appealing to potential bidders, who may be willing to accept lower discount or even pay 
slight premium. Additionally, in a P&A transaction of a larger failed bank, the fixed costs such 
as the costs for due diligence are spread over larger size, leading to lower transaction costs per 
unit of assets acquired. Therefore, the acquirer of a larger failed bank may be willing to accept 
lower discount due to larger potential synergy and lower transaction costs. On the other hand, the 
size of failed bank can negatively affect bidding price by making the target less affordable to 
potential bidders. The FDIC may find it more difficult to resolve bigger failed banks due to the 
overall weakening purchasing power of survivor banks during the financial crisis, thus a higher 
discount is required to sell a large failed bank. Empirical results by Cochran et al. (1995) show 
that larger failed banks give rise to larger wealth transfer to acquirers. Possible explanations they 
provided include synergy effect and over subsidization, with the former expected to decrease 
discount while the latter to increase discount. 
An alternative way to analyze size effect is calculating the relative size of the target and the 
acquirer. Christoffersen et al. (2012) reported positive relation between the relative size ratio 
(defined as target deposits/acquirer deposits) and the abnormal return, implying the larger size of 
the target relative to the acquirer leads to larger discount. In our study, we adapt the relative size 
method and hypothesize that:  
H3: Relative size of target to acquirer is associated with discount.  
 
Loss sharing agreement, as a unique risk-management tool used in the FDIC P&A transactions, 
is worthy of our special attention when considering the determinants of discount. Under loss 
sharing agreement, the FDIC promises to reimburse 80% of the losses, if ever occurred by the 
acquirer after the merger; the FDIC is also entitled to benefit from 80% of the potential gains 
from the recoveries of charged-off assets by acquirer. In order to gain the protection from the 
down-side risk, the acquirers are willing to pay more for such insurance. As a matter of fact, one 
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purpose of loss sharing is to minimize the costs to DIF by raising potential acquirers’ confidence 
thus increasing the bid price. If the loss sharing agreement functions well as designed, we expect: 
H4: The use of loss sharing agreement will have a negative relation to discount. 
 
3.2 Discount and Bargain Purchase Gains 
BPG, the earning from a bargain deal to be reported within 12 months after the merger, can be 
regarded as the part of discount admitted by the acquirers. Theoretically, the amount of reported 
BPGs should be directly related to discount level. 
The key difference between the FDIC-assisted P&A transactions and unassisted mergers is the 
involvement of the FDIC.  In the closed-form auctions, the restrictions placed by the FDIC on 
the participants’ eligibility reduce the bidding competitiveness and the special role of the FDIC 
as an intermediary responsible for all the insured deposit repayments decreases the bargaining 
power of the FDIC during the crisis period. Therefore, discount for the FDIC-assisted P&A 
transactions is expected to be, on average, higher than the unassisted mergers. In terms of 
reporting frequency, the acquirers in the FDIC-assisted mergers are expected to report BPGs 
more frequently compared with their counterparts in the regular mergers. One possible 
explanation is that the purposes of reporting BPGs are different for the two groups of acquirers. 
For the assisted group, the vast majority of the failed bank in our sampling period are acquired at 
discount and BPG is used to claim the discount they receive from a bargain purchase. For the 
unassisted group, BPG functions as an earning smoothing technique and the acquiring 
institutions with declining net incomes are more likely to report BPGs (Dunn et al. 2015). We 
believe the acquirers who received discounts in the assisted group are far more than the acquirers 
who were experiencing earning decline before the merger, thus more frequent BPG reporting 
should be observed in the assisted group. Based on the discussion above, we hypothesize that: 
H5(a): the acquirers of the FDIC-assisted mergers on average report higher BPGs than 
those of the unassisted mergers. 
H5(b): the acquirers of the FDIC-assisted mergers on average report BPGs more 
frequently compared with those of the unassisted mergers. 
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3.3 Discount and Post-Merger Performance of Acquirer 
Evidences (James and Wier 1987, Bertin, Ghanzanfari and Torbzadeh 1989, Cochrane, Rose and 
Fraser 1995, Zhang 1997, Cowan and Salotti 2015) support positive and significant abnormal 
returns for acquirers in P&A transactions. The positive stock market reaction can be explained 
by expected performance improvement for the merged entity or discount in such acquisitions. 
Improvements in accounting ratios may be just an artifact of the higher discount. It is reasonable 
to suspect the assets in a failed bank do not worth their book value, however, a high asset 
discount in such transactions may result in an inflated post-merger performance ratio. We 
consider return on asset (ROA) a profitability indicator. In P&A transactions, if larger-than-
actual discounts are offered by the FDIC to the acquirer, the calculated ROA will be 
overestimated as a result of smaller denominator. The similar inflated effect also applies to ROE. 
So we want to test: 
H6: the improvements in the post-merger profitability of acquirers partially result from 
discount.
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4. Methodology  
4.1 Discount Measurement 
In this research, we use two different methods to measure the level of discount offered by the 
FDIC to the acquiring institutions.  
In failed banks mergers & acquisitions (M&As), buyers are usually willing to pay a premium 
when assuming the deposits of the failed banks but pay a discounted price when purchasing the 
failed banks’ assets. This is because deposits capture the franchise value or charter value of a 
bank, such as customer relationships, customer lists and value of the physical and online 
locations. In the sub-group of the whole-bank transactions, franchise value could be a major 
incentive for the acquiring institution to assume all the deposits of the failed bank, including the 
uninsured deposits. Only taking into account asset premium/discount and deposit premium into 
account, we calculate our first estimate of discount following Cowan & Salotti (2015). We call it 
Premium/Discount at Transaction.  
Method 1: 
Discount(Premium)% = −
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑇
 
In Method 2, we assume that Equity (Assets – Liabilities) six months before the merger as the 
fair value of the failed bank, instead of the value provided by the FDIC in the auction summary. 
The FDIC often uses most recent quarter value of equity in their preparation of information for 
the auction. Since the failing institution has the incentive to manipulate the financial report when 
it is close to fail, we use equity value two quarters before the transaction in order to achieve 
better accuracy of equity value. According to Cowan & Salotti (2015) and Grant Thornton 
(2010), amount due from the FDIC or the acquiring institution is determined by adding up three 
components. The first component is asset premium/discount in dollar amount. The second 
component is deposit premium in dollar amount which is simply deposits multiplied by deposit 
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premium in percentage. The third component is transactional equity, the difference between total 
assets and total liabilities of the failed bank at the estimation time. The sum of the above three 
components is the amount due from the FDIC or the acquiring institution. In most P&A 
transactions, it is the FDIC that makes payments to the acquiring institutions, when the amount 
due from the FDIC or the acquiring institution is negative. So in the formula we use the 
estimated value of equity at the merger time, EV(Equityt), to indicate the amount due from the 
FDIC or the acquiring institution. 
Method 2: 
Discount(Premium)% =
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−0.5 − 𝐸𝑉(𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑇−0.5
 
Where EV(Equityt) = Assetst – Liabilitiest – Asset Discount + Deposit Premium 
 
4.2 Analysis: Factors Affecting Discount  
Two geographic factors are included in the regression as control variables. First, we add dummy 
variables Same City and Same State, both equal to 1 if the failed bank and the acquiring 
institution are located in the same city or the same state, respectively, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
This dummy variable may have a positive or negative sign. An acquiring institution which is 
located in the same city or same state as the failed bank may be willing to pay premium or accept 
less discount because acquiring the failed bank may generate economies of scale and scope. On 
the other hand, there are also cases in which the outsiders pay more because by acquiring the 
failing bank may be their way to expand to a new geographical region. We include a state 
characteristic variable to capture the economic condition of the state of the failing bank. We 
choose the quarterly average unemployment rate in a specific state where the failed bank is 
located. A failed bank located in a state suffering from the negative post-crisis impact may be 
more difficult for the FDIC to resolve due to lack of potential buyers within the same state due to 
the lower potential to generate post-merger synergy and given the higher risk. 
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Number of bids is selected as the competition indicator. In the P&A auction, a bidder can submit 
more than one bid and the FDIC selects the least-cost bid for the DIF. Compared with number of 
bidders, number of bids more accurately reflects the level of bidding competitiveness.  
We use quarterly DIF Reserve Ratio as the proxy for the financial pressure on the FDIC. 
Christoffersen et al. (2012) argue that large abnormal returns of the acquiring institutions in the 
FDIC failed bank merger are associated with large DIF outflows, which can be interpreted as the 
financial pressure on the FDIC. We argue that if the abnormal returns are related to the wealth 
transfer then the FDIC is more likely to offer higher discount to the acquiring institutions when 
the FDIC is financially constrained.  
We include a relative size variable. This is a ratio of total liabilities of the failed bank on the total 
liabilities of the acquirer. As we discussed in H3, relative size can have mixed effects on 
discount. If we find positive relation between relative size and discount, it means the difficulty to 
resolve the larger failed banks offsets the benefits of potential synergy. 
The last factor we consider is the involvement of loss sharing agreement. Loss sharing agreement 
between the acquiring institution and the FDIC changes the risk profile of the acquirer by 
decreasing the down-side loss as well as decreasing the up-side gain. This risk-management 
technique is used by the FDIC to market the failed bank quickly and less-costly. Accordingly, we 
expect that loss sharing agreement lowers the discount level. In terms of percentage of assets 
covered by loss sharing agreement, the higher percentage covered by loss sharing should 
decrease the discount, if the FDIC is not over-subsidizing the acquirers. 
Based on what we discussed above, we organize Equation 1 as follows: 
Equation 1:  
 discount1(or 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡2) = α0 + α1same city(or 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒) + α2state characteristic +
α3number of bids + α4DIF reserve ratio + α5relative size + α6lsa (or 
𝑙𝑠𝑎
𝑡𝑙
) + ε 
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4.3 Analysis: Factors Affecting Bargain Purchase Gain (BPG) 
We argue that BPG is also a form of discount. As such we argue that similar factors will also be 
helpful to explain BPG except for the loss-sharing-related variables (lsa and lsa/tl) are applied 
here. Following Dunn et al. (2015), we further add a set of variables to reflect the pre-merger 
profitability/earnings change of the acquirer.  Equation 2 is constructed as follows: 
Equation 2: 
BPG
TL
= α0 + α1same city(or 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒) + α2state characteristic + α3number of bids +
α4DIF reserve ratio + α5relative size +α6pre − merger profitability change +ε  
For α6, the estimation is based on different sets of changes in profitability indicators for different 
time periods, including ROA and ROE changes for past one quarter, half year and one year 
before the merger. 
We estimate this equation using Tobit model. In theory, BPG should be no more than the value 
of failed bank liabilities. Therefore, Tobit estimation is more appropriate because the value of 
bpg/tl varies between 0 and 1. 
 
4.4 Analysis: Effect of Discount on Post-Merger Performance of Acquirer 
As we illustrated in Hypothesis 6, acquirer’s post-merger performance, especially profitability, 
may be partly driven by the accounting treatment of the discount. Based on Behr and Heid 
(2011), size, cost-income ratio, interest margin, equity ratio, non-performing loans and liquidity 
ratio are identified as typical bank-specific factors that impact the profitability. We use the bank-
specific factors as control variables and analyze the effect of acquiring a failed bank at a 
discounted price on the acquirer’s profitability change using Equation 3: 
Equation 3: 
 post − merger profitability change = α0 + α1asize + α2aci + α3aim + α4aeqr + α5anpl +
α
6
alqr + α7discount1(or 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡2) +ε 
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5. Data  
Our sample of failed banks comes from the failed bank list disclosed on the FDIC website. There 
was a total of 349 banks that failed during our sample period, the fourth quarter of 2009 to the 
first quarter of 2013. The cut-offs of sample period depend on data availability and our research 
purpose. More specifically, standardized bid summaries were not available until the late second 
quarter of 2009 and the reporting of BPGs became mandatory at the fourth quarter of 2009. 
Moreover, since our research purpose focuses on post-crisis period, we drop failed banks that 
happened after the first quarter of 2013.  
The sample filtering process includes the following steps. First, we eliminate the non-whole-
bank transactions for the simplicity of accounting analysis. In whole-bank transactions, the 
acquiring institutions assume all the deposits and purchases all the assets of the failed banks. 
Second, we exclude the cases in which the acquiring institutions participated in another merger 
with or without the assistance of the FDIC as acquirer or was a target for subsequent merger 
anytime from one year before through one year after the studied merger, in order to avoid the 
noise from the other mergers. We further delete the cases where a bridge bank involved. Lastly, 
we drop the cases with missing variables for our main test and use the full sample for robustness 
test. The above processes leave us a filtered sub-sample of 99 transactions and a full sample of 
122 transactions, as shown in Table C.1. 
INSERT TABLE C.1 HERE 
 
For each P&A transaction, we collect the information about bidding details, level of bidding 
competition, and geographic location from the bid summary. The bidding details we focus on are 
deposit premium and asset premium/discount offered by the acquiring institution. Number of 
bids is chosen to proxy for bidding competitiveness. To control for the potential effect of 
geographic factors on the discount, we create a dummy variable showing whether the acquiring
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 institution and the failed bank are operating in the same city or same state. For another 
geographic factor (state characteristics), we obtain the quarterly unemployment rate for a specific 
state from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Information about loss-sharing agreement including 
whether the acquiring institution signed a loss-sharing agreement with the FDIC and the amount 
of assets that were covered by the agreement comes from the press release for each transaction.  
Our research also relies on the accounting data. Disclosed in the Consolidated Reports of 
Condition and Income, or simply Call Reports, from the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council (FFIEC), quarterly accounting data for both failed banks and acquiring 
institutions are used to estimate the discount offered by the FDIC to the acquiring institutions. 
On the failed bank side, we collect total assets and total liabilities at the merger time and six 
month before the merger. Log(total assets) is used as a proxy for the size of a failed bank and the 
assets of failed bank divided by the those of acquirer indicates the relative size of the target 
relative to the acquirer. Furthermore, the value of total liabilities is used to scale estimated 
discounts, BPGs, and the amount of assets covered by loss-sharing agreement. On the acquiring 
institution side, we collect quarterly gains on bargain purchases reported one year following the 
merger and what we need to calculate the operating performance as well as the bank-specific 
factors that influence operating performance according to Behr and Heid (2011)
16
. More 
specifically, the BPGs are discounted back to the transaction time by the federal fund rate and 
the sum of the discounted BPGs is scaled by the total liabilities of the failed bank. Next, changes 
in return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) for different time periods (one quarter, 
half year and one year before and after the merger) are used to reflect changes in operating 
performance. The details about the bank-specific factors can be found in Appendix A: Data 
Definitions. 
INSERT TABLE C.2 HERE 
 
Table C.2 provides descriptive statistics of all variables mentioned above, based on the sub-
sample (Panel A) and full sample (Panel B). We mainly focus on Panel A since our main tests 
                                                          
16
 For the data missing in the Call Reports, we searched from the Bank Data & Statistics section of the FDIC website. 
(Link: https://www5.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp) 
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are relied on sub-sample. On average, the assets of a failed bank are sold at a discount of 15.44%, 
while the deposits are assumed at a premium of 0.33%. In an extreme case, the acquirer even 
discounts the failed bank assets as much as 55.7%. In rare cases, premiums are paid on assets, 
with the maximum premium of 27.78%. Deposit premiums stay non-negative and vary from 0 to 
7.65%. The number of bids received varies from 1 to 29 and the average is about 5. Around 77% 
of the mergers involve the failed bank and the acquirer from the same state; however, the ratio 
drops to around 10% when it comes to cases in which the failed bank and the acquirer are located 
in the same city. Next, the relative size is found to be 65.4% on average, while the maximum 
relative size is as large as 2246% (that is, the total liabilities of the target are 22.46 times as large 
as the total liabilities of the acquirer.) Another fact of the near-zero value of average DIF reserve 
ratio shows that the FDIC was under financial pressure during our sample period
17
. State 
characteristic, defined as quarterly unemployment rate of the states where the failed banks locate, 
shows a range from 4.2% to 16.9%, with a mean of 9.04%. With regard to the loss sharing 
agreement, the FDIC signed loss sharing agreement with the acquirer in slightly more than half 
(51%) of the selected transactions, and loss sharing agreement, on average, covers 38.31% failed 
bank assets
18
.
                                                          
17
 In the full sample, the average DIF reserve ratio is even negative (-2.38%). 
18
 Note that assets under loss sharing agreement are scaled by total liabilities of failed bank. 
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6. Results 
6.1 Discount and Factors Influencing Discount  
We start with measuring discount using two different methods. Table C.3 presents the estimated 
discounts for sub-sample and full sample in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. Focusing on sub-
sample, the mean for discount calculated by method 2 (12.31%) is bigger than that for discount 
by method 1 (11.91%). At the upper extreme, we can see discount reach as large as 55.70% 
under method 1 and 56.94% under method 2. At the lower extreme, the acquirer pays a premium 
of 27.78% under method 1 and a premium of 25.22% under method 2. The results for the full 
sample are similar.  
INSERT TABLE C.3 HERE 
 
We next examine the factors determining the discount. Table C.4 shows the correlation matrix of 
all relevant independent variables based on the sub-sample. There are several pairs of larger 
correlations worth our attention. First, we can see that the correlation between DIF reserve ratio 
and state characteristic has a negative sign and a relative large magnitude of -0.4067, suggesting 
the worse the economic condition in states where the failed banks are located (higher 
unemployment rate), the higher the financial pressure of the FDIC is (lower DIF reserve ratio). 
Second, it seems that the FDIC more often uses loss sharing agreement to market the failed 
banks when the FDIC itself is financially constrained (low DIF reserve ratio), which is implied 
by the correlation between DIF reserve ratio and lsa of -0.3562. Moreover, in the cases with a 
loss sharing agreement, more assets are covered by loss sharing when the DIF reserve ratio is 
lower, reflected by the correlation between DIF reserve ratio and lsa/tl of -0.3774.  Third, a 
positive and relative large correlation between state characteristic and lsa of 0.2685 shows that 
loss sharing is more used in transactions where the failed bank is located in a badly impacted 
state in financial crisis, with quarterly unemployment rate in the state as the proxy for general
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economic condition in that state. Similarly, in states with worse economic condition, the FDIC is 
willing to offer larger coverage for the failed bank assets, shown by the correlation between state 
characteristic and lsa/tl of 0.2768. Last, since lsa and lsa/tl have a quite high correlation of 
0.9751, we do not include both of them in our regression in order to avoid multicollinearity. 
INSERT TABLE C.4 HERE 
 
In Panel A and Panel B of Table C.5 we present the regression results for factors influencing 
discount calculated by method 1 and method 2, respectively.  As expected, number of bids (used 
as a proxy for bidding competitiveness) is found to be significant both statistically and 
economically. With number of bids increasing by one, discount on average is predicted to 
decrease by 0.41% (for discount1) to 0.54% (for discount2).  This finding aligns with the previous 
finding by James and Wier (1987b) regarding the negative effect of competition on acquirer’s 
abnormal returns.  
DIF reserve ratio does not appear as a significant factor under either discount calculation method, 
which is inconsistent with Christoffersen et al. (2012). In other words, our results suggest that the 
deteriorated financial condition of the FDIC during financial crisis does not cause larger discount 
of the failed bank.  
In terms of relative size between the failed bank and the acquirer, the results show a strong 
positive relation between relative size and discount level at 99% confidence level under both 
calculation methods. Economically, a 1% increase in relative size will, on average, lead to a 0.83% 
increase in discount1 and 0.75% increase in discount2. The positive relation implies that the 
FDIC offers larger discount to acquirers who buy a larger target relative to their own size, given 
the limited purchasing power of the acquirers during financial crisis. The effect of size on 
making the deal more risky and more difficult to complete surpasses the effect on cutting 
transaction costs and generating potential synergies, which is reasonable during the economic 
downturn. 
The last factor we focus on is loss sharing agreement. We test loss sharing agreement separately 
as a dummy variable and as a ratio of the assets value covered by the loss sharing arrangement to 
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total liabilities of the failed bank. Both results turn out to be significant and the negative. Loss 
sharing agreement is designed to increase incentive for the acquirers to purchase more assets of 
the failed bank, and keep more assets within the banking system. The involvement of loss 
sharing is supposed to cut the resolution costs for the DIF, thus lowering the discount level. 
Similarly, more assets covered by the loss sharing agreement should also be associated with the 
incentive for potential acquirers to bid higher (accept less discount). The magnitude of the 
coefficients is economically significant as well. Compared to cases that are not covered by loss 
sharing agreement, acquirers have received less discount (11.88% less for discount by method 1 
and 10.56% less for discount by method 2) when they acquired a failed bank. Furthermore, 1% 
increase in lsa/tl will lead to 14.59% decrease in discount1 and 13.45% decrease in discount2. 
As for our geographical control variables, same city and same state, results are inconclusive. 
Buying a failed bank in the same geographical location may allow the acquirers to gain more 
market shares in the local market, and the strategic value of empire building along with the 
merger encourages the acquirers to bid higher and accept lower discount. On the other hand, it is 
also possible for the acquirer to bid lower and ask for higher discount due to lack of geographical 
diversity. From results in Table C.5, we observe that acquirers operating in the same city as the 
failed bank tend to bid lower in Panel A, which supports our first explanation. However, those in 
the same state as the failed bank tend to bid higher in Panel B, consistent with our second 
explanation. 
INSERT TABLE C.5 HERE 
 
In summary, bidding competitiveness, relative size and loss sharing agreement are found to play 
a key role in determining the discount level in whole-bank P&A transactions, while DIF reserve 
ratio does not seem to be a significant factor. Actually, DIF reserve ratio could represent the 
overall economic condition in banking industry to some extent. The positive relationship 
between DIF reserve ratio and number of bids showed in Table C.4 provides supportive evidence 
to this alternative explanation, which implies that the better overall economic condition allows 
more eligible banks to participate and bid in P&A auctions. 
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6.2 Discount Reflected by Bargain Purchase Gains 
By comparing BPG in the FDIC-assisted mergers and that in the unassisted mergers, we can 
approximately compare the discounts in the two types of mergers. Table C.6 provides the 
descriptive statistics of the average BPGs reported by the acquirers in FDIC-assisted and non-
FDIC-assisted mergers, both scaled by total liabilities of the target bank (for FDIC assisted 
mergers they are the failed banks). The non-assisted-merger sample is determined using similar 
filtering process as we did for the assisted-merger sample. Transaction type (such as all deposit 
whole bank, all deposit modified whole bank, and clean P&A) is disclosed in bid summary for 
each FDIC-assisted P&A transaction, but there is no such information disclosed for unassisted 
mergers
19
. The cases in which the acquirers participate in more than one merger within (-1 year, 
+1 year) window are excluded, resulting in a non-assisted-merger sample size of 316. Further, 
we discount BPGs for both groups by Federal Funds Rate, sum up the discounted values and 
present the sum as a fraction of the total liabilities of the failed bank.  
INSERT TABLE C.6 HERE 
 
The mean value of BPG (and their frequency) for the FDIC-assisted mergers is dramatically 
larger than that of the non-assisted mergers (7.57% vs. 1.27% for sub sample; 6.22% vs. 1.27% 
for full sample) and the differences in mean are statistically significant at 99% confidence level. 
In addition, the comparison on reporting frequency reveals that 60.61%
20
 of acquirers in the 
FDIC-assisted mergers report BPGs, while only 13.29% of their counterparts in non-assisted 
mergers report BPGs.  
Tobit estimation result of equation 2 is presented in the Table C.8. We find number of bids have 
significant and negative impact on BPG. It is consistent with our previous result of discount that 
competitiveness increases bid price and reduce discount. 
Our results do not support the earning smoothing incentive argued by Dunn et al. (2015), which 
reports larger BPGs is associated with pre-acquisition earnings decline of the acquirers. Possible 
                                                          
19
 There is no transaction type disclosure at least from the source we obtain the unassisted merger data. 
20
 This information is from sub-sample. For full sample, the reporting frequency is 50%, still much higher than the 
non-assisted-merger sample. 
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explanations may arise from differences in sample and estimation method. First, our study 
focuses on whole-bank transactions rather than all P&A transactions as in Dunn et al. (2015). 
Second, their sampling period from 2009 to 2010 covers a shorter post-crisis period, compared 
with our sampling period from 2009Q4 to 2013Q1. In addition, Dunn et al. (2015) use both BPG 
and earning decline as dummy variables, while we use them as continuous variables. 
INSERT TABLE C.8 HERE 
 
We re-estimate Equation 2 pulling together the sample of the FDIC-assisted mergers and regular 
mergers over the same period. We do not include number of bids information in the model since 
for regular mergers that information is missing. From the results presented in Table C.9 we find 
that only state characteristics effects BPG. The positive sign implies that the worse economic 
condition in the state of the target bank the higher BPG reported by acquiring institution.  
INSERT TABLE C.9 HERE 
 
 
6.3 Effect of Discount on Post-Merger Profitability Change of Acquirers 
We report the estimation of Equation 3 in Panel A and Panel B of Table C.10, with Panel A 
containing results for ROA change and Panel B for ROE change. As expected, participating in a 
failed bank merger with a bargain purchase (with discount) can positively impact the financial 
indicator of profitability for acquirers. 
The independent variables comprise possible profitability determinants from two aspects. In one 
aspect, the post-merger profitability changes may be driven by bank-specific factors, which we 
consider as the indicators of the fundamental ability of the acquiring institution. In another aspect, 
discount received in a failed bank acquisition may artificially inflate the chosen profitability 
indicators, as explained in the hypothesis development chapter. Consistent with our hypothesis 
we expect the sign for α7 to be positive and significant, showing that larger discount results in 
larger profitability improvement. Consistent with our theory, for discounts calculated by method 
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1 and method 2 positively affect ROA change as well as ROE change for one quarter and half 
year after the merger, though the coefficients of discount for ROA change is less significant 
economically than coefficient change for ROE change. Another interesting observation is that 
the effect gradually fades away after one year. Accordingly, we can conclude that the effect of 
discount on post-merger profitability improvements is temporary. 
INSERT TABLE C.10 HERE 
 
6.4 Robustness Test 1: Results Based on Full Sample 
In order to test the consistency of our results, we do the same analysis on the discount and the 
BPG based on the largest sample. Table C.11 we present the results of discount determinants. 
The same factors are identified as significant (number of bids, relative size, lsa and lsa/tl). 
Similar results again are found in Table C.12 with regard to BPG determinants; Tobit estimation 
turn out to be exactly the same, only with variations in coefficients. The positive relation 
between ROE change and bpg/tl is consistent with what we find for non-FDIC-assisted mergers. 
We tend to believe it results from the recovery of overall economic condition in banking industry. 
Table C.13 provides the robustness of post-merger profitability change for acquirers. Similar 
short-term effect of discount on acquirers’ profitability is found for both ROA and ROE. 
INSERT TABLE C.11 HERE 
INSERT TABLE C.12 HERE 
INSERT TABLE C.13 HERE 
 
6.5 Robustness Test 2: Relative Size  
As shown in Table C.2, the maximum relative size between the failed bank and the acquirer is as 
high as 22 times. In order to avoid the bias from the extreme cases, we exclude three cases in 
which the relative size is larger than or equal to two and report the results of discount 
determinants in Table C.14. Relative size becomes insignificant, showing that the previously-
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identified significant relation between relative size and discount may be driven by the extreme 
cases.  
INSERT TABLE C.14 HERE 
 
6.6 Robustness Test 3: Results across Sub-Periods  
Adding on robustness test 2, we further test the consistency of our results across different phases 
of financial crisis. We split our sample into two sub-periods, with the first half from 2009Q4 to 
2010Q4 and the second half from 2011Q1 to 2013Q1. As shown in Figure B.3, the DIF reserve 
ratio became negative during 2009Q3 and 2011Q1, suggesting the contraction and trough phase 
of financial crisis in our sampling period. The way we split our sample differentiates the 
contraction phase and recovery phase and the results of the two sub-periods are different.  
In Table 15, we show results of discount determinants for two sub-periods in Panel A and Panel 
B, respectively. The results for the first sub-period are consistent with our previous results in 
robustness test 2, while results for the second sub-period are slightly different because number of 
bids becomes insignificant. Furthermore, the results of BPG regression show similar results with 
our main test for the first sub-period. For the second sub-period, DIF reserve ratio is significant 
at 10% significance level.  
INSERT TABLE C.15 HERE 
INSERT TABLE C.16 HERE
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7. Conclusion 
In this study, we measure the discount in the FDIC-assisted P&A transactions using accounting 
information and examine the determinants of the discount, based on a unique sample of whole-
bank transactions in the recent financial crisis. We find that less bidding competition, larger size 
of the failed bank relative to the acquirer and the absence of loss sharing agreement are 
associated with larger discount in the FDIC-assisted failed bank acquisitions. However, relative 
size becomes insignificant after we exclude the extreme cases in which the relative size between 
the failed bank and the acquirer is larger than or equal to two. Moreover, we fail to find evidence 
that the financial health of the FDIC affects the discount, as documented by Christoffersen et al. 
(2012). We further investigate if the identified factors for the discount also affect BPG reported 
by the acquirers, an indicator we believe directly related to the discount. By a comparison 
analysis, we find significantly larger BPGs are reported by acquirers in the FDIC-assisted 
acquisitions, compared to those in the non-assisted acquisitions. Additionally, the acquirers in 
the FDIC-assisted mergers also on average report BPGs more frequently. Above findings 
provide evidence for larger discount experienced by the failed banks resolved by the FDIC-
assisted P&A transactions. The regression results show that only bidding competitiveness among 
the factors above continue to be significant, consistent with prior literature (Dunn et al. 2015). In 
a robustness test, we also observe some significance of DIF reserve ratio for a sub-period from 
2011Q1 to 2013Q1. What we find inconsistent with Dunn et al. (2015) is the earning 
management by the acquirers using BPGs. Results from our FDIC-assisted-merger sample do not 
provide evidence for the earning management. This is probably a result of differences in sample 
composition and estimation specifications used in our study.  
These findings have further implications for the prevalent existence of discount in the FDIC-
assisted failed bank acquisitions. Discount is a result of the nature, structure, and timing of this 
subset of acquisitions, as suggested by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency [OCC] in 
2010. The nature of closed-form auction with only qualified participants creates a less
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competitive bidding environment. The resolution structure, with limited resolution time allowed 
and limited information distributed, makes it harder to get accurate value estimation, leading 
participants to bid more conservatively. Moreover, the timing of these acquisitions during 
industry distress forces the FDIC to offer larger discount in cases where an interested participant 
bids for a larger size failed bank than itself, or the target may turn out to unaffordable to potential 
bidders. As it is designed, loss sharing agreement successfully decreases the discount and cuts 
the resolution costs for the DIF. 
We also conduct a cross-sectional analysis and document that discount has explanatory power of 
the short-term post-merger profitability improvements of the acquirers. Nevertheless, the effect 
ceases to exist after one year. This finding supports our thought that the post-merger profitability 
improvements of the acquirers are overestimated due to the existence of discount during a period 
of industry-wide crisis. Previous literatures have shown that the market reacts positively to the 
FDIC-assisted failed bank resolution events, expecting the merged entity to experience post-
merger synergies. Our study points out that the synergy we observe from accounting information 
may be overestimated in the shorter term, because the existence of discount leads to 
underestimated denominator for profitability indicators and yields an artificial profitability 
improvement. 
Focusing on the sample of the most recent financial crisis, our study provides insights on the 
differences between the FDIC-assisted mergers and the non-FDIC-assisted mergers in terms of 
discount, the determinants of discount, and the effects of discount on post-merger profitability 
improvements for acquiring institutions. Since no previous literature has looked into the 
determinants of discount so far, our study contributes to the literatures of the FDIC-assisted 
failed bank acquisitions. 
Further implications can be made for the FDIC and bank managers. For the FDIC, the negative 
relation between loss sharing agreement and discount implies that loss sharing agreement 
functions well to decrease the costs for DIF. For bank managers, the results of our study suggest 
the managers of the financially-sound banks participate in the FDIC-assisted failed bank P&A 
auctions to take advantage of the discount offered by the FDIC and its transitory effect on 
boosting post-merger profitability.  
35 
 
With regard to future research, we provide the following several suggestions. First, our discount 
measurement can be imperfect, and more adjustments can be made on the components of 
discount. For instance, instead of directly using the equity value two quarters before the merger 
as the fair value of failed bank, we can estimate the fair equity value at the merger time based on 
the average quarterly deterioration rate for the past one year. Second, future researchers can 
further distinguish the differences between publicly-traded banks and private banks. Unlike the 
limitation on financial information for corporate mergers, the availability of accounting 
information for both publicly-traded and private banks makes it possible to look into the 
differences between the two groups.  
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Appendix A: Data Definition 
Variable Definition 
Call Report Code 
FFIEC 03121 FFIEC 04122 
discount1 
discount calculated by proposed 
method 1 
N/A N/A 
discount2 
discount calculated by proposed 
method 2 
N/A N/A 
same city 
failed bank and acquirer are in the 
same city (dummy) 
N/A N/A 
same state 
failed bank and acquirer are in the 
same state (dummy) 
N/A N/A 
lsa 
loss-sharing agreement involved 
case (dummy) 
N/A N/A 
lsa/tl 
assets covered by loss-sharing 
agreement divided by total 
liabilities of the target 
N/A N/A 
bpg/tl 
discounted sum of bargain 
purchase gains divided by total 
liabilities of the target 
RIADJ447/RCFD2948 RIADJ447/RCON2948 
relative size 
liabilities of the target/ liabilities 
of the acquirer 
RCFD2948target/RCFD
2948acquirer 
RCON2948target/RCON2948acquirer 
DIF reserve ratio 
the DIF balance divided by 
estimated insured deposits 
N/A N/A 
state characteristic 
quarterly unemployment rate in 
percentage within the state where 
the failed bank is located 
N/A N/A 
tl total liability RCFD2948  RCON2948 
a_size log(assets of the acquirer) log(RCFD2170 ) log(RCON2170) 
a_ci 
cost-income ratio of the acquirer = 
sum of current interest and non-
interest expenses/ sum of current 
interest and non-interest incomes 
(RIAD4037+RIAD4093
)/(RIAD4107+RIAD40
79) 
(RIAD4037+RIAD4093)/(RIAD4107+
RIAD4079) 
a_im 
interest margin of the acquirer = 
interest rate on interest-bearing 
assets – interest rate on interest-
bearing liabilities 
RIAD4107/[RCFD2170
-
(RCFD0081+RCFDB63
9)]-
RIAD4073/[RCFD2950
-
(RCON6631+RCFN663
1+RCFD2930)] 
RIAD4107/[RCON2170-
(RCON0081+RCONB639)]-
RIAD4073/[RCON2950-
(RCON6631+RCON6631+RCON2930
)] 
a_eqr 
equity ratio of the acquirer = 
equity/ lagged assets 
RCFD3210/lRCFD2170 RCON3210/lRCON2170 
a_lqr 
liquidity ratio of the acquirer = 
total liquid assets (cash and cash 
equivalence, fed funds sod, 
securities available for sale, 
securities held to maturity)/ 
lagged total assets 
(RCFD0010+RCONB9
87+RCFDB989+RCFD
1754+RCFD1773)/lRC
FD2170 
(RCFD0010+RCONB987+RCONB989
+RCON1754+RCON1773)/lRCON217
0 
pre_roa_onequarter Acquirer return on assets change ROA: ROA: RIAD4340/RCON2170 
                                                          
21 Call Report Code which starts with RCFD comes from Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income for A Bank With 
Domestic and Foreign Offices—FFIEC 031 
 
22 Call Report Code which starts with RCON comes from Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income for a Bank with 
Domestic Offices Only—FFIEC 041 
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one quarter BEFORE the merger RIAD4340/RCFD2170 
pre_roa_halfyear 
Acquirer return on assets change 
half year BEFORE the merger 
same as above same as above 
a_npl 
non-performing loan of the 
acquirer = total current non-
performing loans (loans past due 
90 days or more but still accruing 
plus nonaccrual loans)/ lagged 
total assets 
a. loans past due 90 
days or more (2009 and 
2010): 
RCON2769+RCON349
4+RCON5399+RCON
C237+RCONC239+RC
ON3500+RCON3503+
RCFDB573+RCFD537
8+RCFD5381+RCFD1
597+RCFD1252+RCF
D1255+RCFDB576+R
CFDB579+RCFD5390
+RCFD5460+RCFD54
60+RCFDF167+RCFD
F170 
a. loans past due 90 days or more (2009 
and 2010): 
RCON2769+RCON3494+RCON5399+
RCONC237+RCONC239+RCON3500
+RCON3503+RCONB835RCON1607
+RCONB576+RCONB579+RCON539
0+RCON5460+RCON1227 
a'. loans past due 90 
days or more (since 
2011 ): 
RCONF174+RCONF17
5+RCON3494+RCON5
399+RCONC237+RCO
NC239+RCON3500+R
CONF180+RCONF181
+RCFNB573+RCFD53
78+RCFD5381+RCFD
1597+RCFD1252+RCF
D1255+RCFDB576+R
CFDK214+RCFDK217
+RCFD5390+RCFD54
60+RCFDF167+RCFD
F170 
a'. loans past due 90 days or more 
(since 2011 ): 
RCONF174+RCONF175+RCON3494
+RCON5399+RCONC237+RCONC23
9+RCON3500+RCONF180+RCONF1
81+RCONB835+RCON1607+RCONB
576+RCONK214+RCONK217+RCON
5390+RCON5460+RCON1227 
b. nonaccrual loans 
(2009 and 2010): 
RCON3492+RCON349
5+RCON5400+RCON
C229+RCONC230+RC
ON3501+RCON3504+
RCFDB574+RCFD537
9+RCFD5382+RCFD1
583+RCFD1253+RCF
D1256+RCFDB577+R
CFDB580+RCFD5391
+RCFD5461+RCFDF1
68+RCFDF171 
b. nonaccrual loans (2009 and 2010): 
RCON3492+RCON3495+RCON5400+
RCONC229+RCONC230+RCON3501
+RCON3504+RCONB836+RCON160
8+RCONB577+RCONB580+RCON53
91+RCON5461+RCON1228 
b'. nonaccrual loans 
(since 2011): 
RCONF176+RCONF17
7+RCON3495+RCON5
400+RCONC229+RCO
NC230+RCON3501+R
CONF182+RCONF183
+RCFDB574+RCFD53
79+RCFD5382+RCFD
1583+RCFD1253+RCF
D1256+RCFDB577+R
CFDK215+RCFDK218
+RCFD5391+RCFD54
61+RCFDF168+RCFD
F171 
b'. nonaccrual loans (since 2011): 
RCONF176+RCONF177+RCON3495
+RCON5400+RCONC229+RCONC23
0+RCON3501+RCONF182+RCONF1
83+RCONB836+RCON1608+RCONB
577+RCONK215+RCONK218+RCON
5391+RCON5461+RCON1228 
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pre_roa_oneyear 
Acquirer return on assets change 
one year BEFORE the merger 
same as above same as above 
pre_roe_onequarter Acquirer return on equity change 
one quarter BEFORE the merger 
ROE: 
RIAD4340/(RCFD2170
-RCFD2948) 
ROE: RIAD4340/(RCON2170-
RCON2948) 
pre_roe_halfyear 
Acquirer return on equity change 
half year BEFORE the merger 
same as above same as above 
pre_roe_oneyear 
Acquirer return on equity change 
one year BEFORE the merger 
same as above same as above 
post_roa_onequarte
r 
Acquirer return on assets change 
one quarter AFTER the merger 
ROA: 
RIAD4340/RCFD2170 
ROA: RIAD4340/RCON2170 
post_roa_halfyear 
Acquirer return on assets change 
half year AFTER  the merger 
same as above same as above 
post_roa_oneyear 
Acquirer return on assets change 
one year AFTER  the merger 
same as above same as above 
post_roe_onequarte
r 
Acquirer return on equity change 
one quarter AFTER the merger 
ROE: 
RIAD4340/(RCFD2170
-RCFD2948) 
ROE: RIAD4340/(RCON2170-
RCON2948) 
post_roe_halfyear 
Acquirer return on equity change 
half year AFTER the merger 
same as above same as above 
post_roe_oneyear 
Acquirer return on equity change 
one year AFTER  the merger 
same as above same as above 
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Appendix B: Figures 
Historical Incidence of Bank Failures 
 
Figure B.1: Historical Incidence of Bank FailuresThis graph plots the frequency of 
bank failures resolved by the FDIC Purchase & Assumption from 1934 to 2010.  
Source: Christofferson et al. (2012) Figure 1 
 
 
 
Figure B.2: Incidence of the FDIC-Insured Bank Failures during 2008 and 2013 
This graph shows frequency of the FDIC-insured bank failures during 2008 and 2013 and 
the portion resolved by the FDIC Purchase & Assumption.  
Source: the FDIC website – historical statistics – Failures and Assistance Transactions 
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Figure B.3: Historical Variation of Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) Reserve Ratio 
This graph demonstrates the fluctuation of Deposit Insurance Fund reserve ratio during 2009 Q1 
and 2013 Q2. Deposit Insurance Fund reserve ratio is defined as the Deposit Insurance Fund 
balance divided by estimated insured deposits and is reported in the FDIC quarterly reports.  
Source: the FDIC quarterly reports  
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Appendix C: Tables 
 
Table C.1 
Sample Filtering 
Failed banks resolved by P&A transactions    349 
Less:  
    Non-whole bank transactions 
  
-22 
Failed banks which the FDIC failed to find an acquirer -16 
Multiple acquisitions within (-1 , +1) window by the same acquirer -187 
Bridge banks involved cases 
  
-2 
    
Filtered full sample 
  
122 
Less: 
    
Cases with missing variables 
 
-23 
     Filtered sub-sample      99 
This table provides the sample filtering process. Sampling period is from 
2009Q4 to 2013Q1. Some cases fall into multiple elimination categories. 
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Table C.2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: sub-sample with no missing variables 
Variable Mean STDEV Min Max N 
asset premium
23
 -0.1544 0.1181 -0.5570 0.2778 99 
deposit premium% 0.0033 0.0094 0.0000 0.0765 99 
number of bids 5.0404 4.9691 1.0000 29.0000 99 
number of bidders 2.9293 1.8912 1.0000 10.0000 99 
same city 0.1010 0.3029 0.0000 1.0000 99 
same state 0.7677 0.4245 0.0000 1.0000 99 
target size 5.1629 0.5287 3.9731 6.7544 99 
relative size 0.6540 2.3219 0.0079 22.4595 99 
DIF reserve ratio 0.0033 0.2899 -0.3900 0.5900 99 
state characteristic 9.0354 2.2868 4.2000 16.9000 99 
lsa 0.5051 0.5025 0.0000 1.0000 99 
lsa/tl 0.3831 0.3909 0.0000 1.0449 99 
pre_roa_onequarter -0.0005 0.0065 -0.0320 0.0202 99 
pre_roe_onequarter -0.0005 0.0527 -0.2123 0.2096 99 
pre_roa_halfyear 0.0004 0.0072 -0.0272 0.0154 99 
pre_roe_halfyear 0.0053 0.0616 -0.2427 0.1319 99 
pre_roa_oneyear 0.0000 0.0073 -0.0318 0.0388 99 
pre_roe_oneyear -0.0002 0.0555 -0.1563 0.2511 99 
post_roa_onequarter 0.0047 0.0093 -0.0123 0.0433 99 
post_roe_onequarter 0.0417 0.0748 -0.1064 0.3347 99 
post_roa_halfyear 0.0043 0.0122 -0.0408 0.0512 99 
post_roe_halfyear 0.0347 0.1020 -0.4693 0.4057 99 
post_roa_oneyear 0.0040 0.0107 -0.0085 0.0658 99 
post_roe_oneyear 0.0298 0.0774 -0.0878 0.5822 99 
a_size 13.3990 1.6809 9.5636 19.5268 99 
a_ci 0.7855 0.2996 0.3543 3.0531 99 
a_im 0.0880 0.0235 0.0194 0.1673 99 
a_eqr 0.1333 0.0633 0.0527 0.4505 99 
a_npl 0.0156 0.0138 0.0000 0.0925 99 
a_lqr 0.3068 0.1703 0.0601 0.8733 99 
Table C.2 shows the descriptive statistics for all independent variables used in our study. Panel 
A presents the results based on sub-sample, which only contains cases without missing variables. 
Source of data: Bid Summaries, Call Reports, Bank Data & Statistics section of the FDIC 
website 
 
 
                                                          
23
 Asset premium is scaled by total liabilities of the failed bank. Negative value means assets are sold at discount; 
positive value means assets are sold at premium. 
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Table C.2 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel B: full sample of companies that survived after all filters 
Variable Mean STDEV Min Max N 
asset premium -0.1514 0.1121 -0.5570 0.2778 122 
deposit premium% 0.0031 0.0087 0.0000 0.0765 122 
number of bids 4.9426 4.6520 1.0000 29.0000 122 
number of bidders 2.9098 1.8542 1.0000 10.0000 122 
same city 0.1066 0.3098 0.0000 1.0000 122 
same state 0.7377 0.4417 0.0000 1.0000 122 
target size 5.2402 0.5629 3.9731 7.0333 122 
relative size 0.6397 2.1130 0.0009 22.4595 121 
DIF reserve ratio -0.0238 0.2850 -0.3900 0.5900 122 
state characteristic 9.1393 2.2453 4.2000 16.9000 122 
lsa 0.5492 0.4996 0.0000 1.0000 122 
lsa/tl 0.4121 0.3855 0.0000 1.0449 122 
pre_roa_onequarter -0.0008 0.0071 -0.0370 0.0202 116 
pre_roe_onequarter -0.0040 0.0569 -0.2827 0.2096 116 
pre_roa_halfyear -0.0003 0.0079 -0.0384 0.0154 116 
pre_roe_halfyear -0.0005 0.0664 -0.2937 0.1319 116 
pre_roa_oneyear -0.0008 0.0090 -0.0466 0.0388 116 
pre_roe_oneyear -0.0076 0.0759 -0.4768 0.2511 116 
post_roa_onequarter 0.0047 0.0128 -0.0458 0.0790 122 
post_roe_onequarter 0.0418 0.1068 -0.4357 0.7187 122 
post_roa_halfyear 0.0037 0.0177 -0.1197 0.0576 122 
post_roe_halfyear 0.0278 0.1382 -0.8487 0.4988 122 
post_roa_oneyear -0.0015 0.0276 -0.2619 0.0658 122 
post_roe_oneyear 0.0074 0.1884 -1.7957 0.5822 122 
a_size 13.4346 1.7099 9.5636 19.5268 100 
a_ci 0.7847 0.2982 0.3543 3.0531 100 
a_im 0.0880 0.0234 0.0194 0.1673 100 
a_eqr 0.1328 0.0632 0.0527 0.4505 100 
a_npl 0.0161 0.0147 0.0000 0.0925 100 
a_lqr 0.3063 0.1695 0.0601 0.8733 100 
Table C.2 shows the descriptive statistics for all independent variables used in our study. 
Panel B presents the results based on the full sample, which includes all cases after data 
filtering process. Source of data: Bid Summaries, Call Reports, Bank Data & Statistics 
section of the FDIC website 
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Table C.3 
Estimated Discounts 
Variable N STDEV Mean Min 
25
th
 
Percentile 
75
th
 
Percentile 
Max 
Panel A: sub-sample 
 
 
 
  
 discount1 99 0.1191 0.1513 -0.2778 0.0893 0.2100 0.5570 
discount2 99 0.1231 0.1657 -0.2522 0.0982 0.2260 0.5694 
bpg/tl 99 0.1171 0.0757 0.0000 0.0000 0.0997 0.6029 
Panel B: full sample 
 
  
  
 discount1 122 0.1131 0.1485 -0.2778 0.0893 0.1971 0.5570 
discount2 122 0.1184 0.1666 -0.2522 0.1029 0.2320 0.5694 
bpg/tl 122 0.1094 0.0622 0.0000 0.0000 0.0699 0.6029 
This table provides the summary statistics of the estimated discounts by two accounting methods, based 
on 124 whole-bank acquisitions between 2009Q4 and 2013Q1. 
Discount is calculated the in following ways:  
Discount(Premium)1% = −
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘
 
Discount(Premium)2% =
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−0.5−𝑀𝑉(𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑇−0.5
 
 
 
 
Table C.4 
Correlation Matrix – Regressions of Discount 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  
1 number of bids 1 
       2 same city 0.0515 1 
      3 same state -0.0874 0.1844 1 
     4 relative size 0.0263 0.0028 0.0908 1 
    5 DIF reserve ratio 0.2494 -0.1119 -0.1288 0.0648 1 
   6 state characteristic -0.1768 0.204 0.1799 -0.1367 -0.4067 1 
  7 lsa -0.1268 0.1307 -0.0184 -0.0882 -0.3562 0.2685 1 
 8 lsa/tl -0.1318 0.1578 0.026 -0.0845 -0.3774 0.2768 0.9751 1 
This table contains correlation matrix of all relevant variables in Equation 1, based on sub-sample. 
 
 
48 
 
Table C.5 
Factors Influencing Discount  
Panel A: Results for Discount Calculated by Method 1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES discount1 discount1 discount1 discount1 discount1 discount1 discount1 
                
same city
24
 0.0237 0.0195 0.0168 0.0337* 0.0376* 0.0382** 0.0424*** 
 
(0.901) (0.645) (0.539) (1.811) (1.855) (2.620) (2.860) 
state 
characteristic -0.0068 -0.0042 -0.0042 0.0009 0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0010 
 
(-1.334) (-0.787) (-0.802) (0.195) (0.132) (-0.166) (-0.224) 
number of bids -0.0033* 
    
-0.0041** -0.0041** 
 
(-1.708) 
    
(-2.230) (-2.181) 
DIF reserve 
ratio 
 
0.0229 
   
-0.0231 -0.0244 
  
(0.533) 
   
(-0.580) (-0.590) 
relative size 
  
0.0083*** 
  
0.0069*** 0.0071*** 
   
(4.176) 
  
(3.859) (4.015) 
lsa 
   
-0.1134*** 
 
-0.1188*** 
 
    
(-4.780) 
 
(-4.853) 
 lsa/tl 
    
-0.1377*** 
 
-0.1459*** 
     
(-4.509) 
 
(-4.441) 
Constant 0.2264*** 0.1873*** 0.1819*** 0.1970*** 0.1946*** 0.2298*** 0.2276*** 
 
(4.907) (4.081) (4.090) (5.616) (5.387) (6.888) (6.700) 
        Observations 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 
Adjusted R-
squared -0.002 -0.018 0.006 0.197 0.172 0.225 0.201 
F-test (Prob>F) 0.1871 0.7529 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Panel A of Table C.5 provides the OLS regression estimates of discount calculated by method. The results are based 
on sub-sample. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix A: Data Definitions. Robust t-statistics are 
listed below each coefficient in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 Dummy variable “same state” is found insignificant for all regressions. 
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Table C.5 (Continued) 
Panel B: Results for Discount Calculated by Method 2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES discount2 discount2 discount2 discount2 discount2 discount2 discount2 
                
same state
25
 -0.0366 -0.0311 -0.0315 -0.0374* -0.0378* -0.0457** -0.0459* 
 
(-1.544) (-1.289) (-1.264) (-1.802) (-1.754) (-2.054) (-1.979) 
state 
characteristic -0.0050 -0.0033 -0.0018 0.0024 0.0023 -0.0006 -0.0007 
 (-0.906) (-0.565) (-0.310) (0.432) (0.410) (-0.117) (-0.142) 
number of bids -0.0049** 
    
-0.0054*** -0.0054*** 
 
(-2.442) 
    
(-2.717) (-2.741) 
DIF reserve 
ratio 
 
-0.0077 
   
-0.0420 -0.0452 
  
(-0.177) 
   
(-1.003) (-1.044) 
relative size 
  
0.0075*** 
  
0.0063*** 0.0064*** 
   
(3.722) 
  
(3.388) (3.513) 
lsa 
   
-0.0958*** 
 
-0.1056*** 
 
    
(-3.689) 
 
(-3.968) 
 lsa/tl 
    
-0.1200*** 
 
-0.1345*** 
     
(-3.698) 
 
(-3.884) 
Constant 0.2338*** 0.1946*** 0.1765*** 0.1901*** 0.1880*** 0.2446*** 0.2437*** 
 
(4.896) (3.997) (3.638) (4.602) (4.466) (6.539) (6.431) 
        Observations 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.010 -0.028 -0.008 0.117 0.108 0.167 0.160 
F-test (Prob>F) 0.0746 0.9550 0.0031 0.0010 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 
Panel B of Table C.5 provides the OLS regression estimates of discount calculated by method 2. The results are 
based on sub-sample. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix A: Data Definitions. Robust t-statistics 
are listed below each coefficient in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 Dummy variable “same city” is found insignificant for all regressions. 
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Table C.6 
Descriptive Statistics of the Bargain Purchase Gain in FDIC-Assisted Mergers and Non-FDIC-
Assisted Mergers 
 
bpg/tl  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Frequency 
FDIC-Assisted 
(Sub) 
99 0.0756533*** 
(-5.11) 
0.117126 0 0.6029459 60.61% 
 
FDIC-Assisted 
(Full) 
122 0.0621629*** 
(-4.69) 
0.1094112 0 0.6029459 50.00% 
 
Non-FDIC-Assisted 316 0.012681 0.065041 0 0.858112 13.29% 
Table C.6 shows the descriptive statistics of the BPG reported by the acquirers in the FDIC-assisted and 
non-FDIC-assisted mergers. Sampling period is from 2009Q4 to 2013Q1. BPG information comes from 
Call Reports. *** = Significantly different from BPG/TL of acquirers in non-FDIC-assisted mergers at 99% 
confidence level. Test statistics are in parenthesis. The detailed tests for difference in means are listed in 
Table 6(continued). 
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Table C.6 (Continued)  
Test for Difference in Mean 
Panel A: test for difference between the mean of the FDIC-assisted sample (sub) and the mean of the non-
assisted sample, at 1% significance level 
  bpg/tl (non-assisted) bpg/tl (assisted-sub) 
Mean 0.012680937 0.075653309 
Known Variance 0.00423 0.013718 
Observations 316 99 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 z -5.108545014 
 P(Z<=z) one-tail 1.62325E-07 
 z Critical one-tail 2.326347874 
 P(Z<=z) two-tail 3.24649E-07 
 z Critical two-tail 2.575829304   
 
Panel B: test for difference between the mean of the FDIC-assisted sample (full) and the mean of the non-
assisted sample, at 1% significance level 
  bpg/tl (non-assisted) bpg/tl (assisted-full) 
Mean 0.012680937 0.062162919 
Known Variance 0.00423 0.011971 
Observations 316 122 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 z -4.685889843 
 P(Z<=z) one-tail 1.39373E-06 
 z Critical one-tail 2.326347874 
 P(Z<=z) two-tail 2.78746E-06 
 z Critical two-tail 2.575829304   
 
 
 
 
 
Table C.7 
Correlation Matrix – Regressions of Bargain Purchase Gain 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
              
1. bpg/tl 1 
            
2. number of bids -0.2239 1 
           
3. same city -0.0683 0.0515 1 
          
4. same state 0.049 -0.0874 0.1844 1 
         
5. relative size -0.0896 0.0263 0.0028 0.0908 1 
        
6. state characteristic -0.0241 -0.1768 0.204 0.1799 -0.1367 1 
       
7.  DIF reserve ratio 0.0308 0.2494 -0.1119 -0.1288 0.0648 -0.4067 1 
      
8. pre_roa_onequarter 0.0258 0.1061 0.072 -0.0168 -0.2923 0.1288 -0.0537 1 
     
9. pre_roe_onequarter 0.0614 0.1102 0.0614 0.0232 -0.0305 0.1656 -0.0542 0.8565 1 
  
 
 
10. pre_roa_halfyear 0.0774 0.0095 0.1313 -0.1119 -0.3775 0.0255 -0.0353 0.664 0.5791 1 
   
11. pre_roe_halfyear 0.0988 0.0224 0.0129 -0.1022 -0.0558 -0.0493 -0.0166 0.4786 0.6289 0.8608 1 
  
12. pre_roa_oneyear -0.0016 -0.0617 0.1966 0.0364 -0.4381 0.1543 0.0543 -0.0586 0.0793 0.192 0.2027 1 
 
13. pre_roe_oneyear -0.0234 -0.0601 0.223 0.0619 -0.0772 0.0556 0.1007 -0.1125 0.0988 0.0783 0.2187 0.896 1 
              This table contains the correlation matrix of all relevant variables in Equation 2, based on sub-sample. Variables are defined in the Appendix A: Data Definition. 
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Table C.8 
Tobit Estimation of Factors Influencing Bargain Purchase Gains Reported by Acquirers in the 
FDIC-Assisted Mergers 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES bpg/tl bpg/tl bpg/tl bpg/tl bpg/tl bpg/tl 
              
number of bids -0.0118*** -0.0123*** -0.0117*** -0.0117*** -0.0116*** -0.0116*** 
 
(-2.81) (-2.94) (-2.79) (-2.82) (-2.78) (-2.77) 
same city -0.0202 -0.0181 -0.0274 -0.0190 -0.0148 -0.0148 
 
(-0.33) (-0.30) (-0.45) (-0.32) (-0.24) (-0.24) 
state characteristic -0.0028 -0.0038 -0.0020 -0.0015 -0.0024 -0.0026 
 
(-0.32) (-0.43) (-0.22) (-0.17) (-0.27) (-0.30) 
DIF reserve ratio 0.0866 0.0876 0.0859 0.0881 0.0890 0.0883 
 
(1.29) (1.31) (1.29) (1.32) (1.31) (1.30) 
relative size -0.0276 -0.0313 -0.02915 -0.0322 -0.0307 -0.0308 
 
(-0.86) (-0.97) (-0.90) (-0.98) (-0.97) (-0.96) 
pre_roa_onequarter 1.9090 
     
 
(0.66) 
     pre_roe_onequarter 
 
0.5786 
    
  
(1.58) 
    pre_roa_halfyear 
  
2.4263 
   
   
(0.91) 
   pre_roe_halfyear 
   
0.3631 
  
    
(1.26) 
  pre_roa_oneyear 
    
-0.8366 
 
     
(-0.31) 
 pre_roe_oneyear 
     
-0.0861 
      
(-0.27) 
Constant 0.1258 0.1371 0.1163 0.1119 0.1217 0.1230** 
 
(1.46) (1.61) (1.35) (1.31) (1.40) (1.42) 
       Observations 99 99 99 99 99 99 
sigma 0.1595 0.1583 0.1591 0.1583 0.1595 0.1595 
Pseudo R2 0.7658 0.8992 0.7902 0.8383 0.7442 0.7427 
Prob>chi2 0.0588 0.0268 0.0511 0.0385 0.0665 0.0671 
 
      
Table C.8 presents the Tobit regression estimates of BPG/TL for the FDIC-assisted mergers. The independent 
variables are defined in the Appendix A: Data Definitions. T-statistics are listed below each coefficient in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.9 
Tobit Estimation of Factors Influencing Bargain Purchase Gains Reported by Acquirers in the 
Non-FDIC-Assisted Mergers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES bpg/tl bpg/tl bpg/tl bpg/tl bpg/tl bpg/tl 
              
same city 0.0888 0.0897 0.00863 0.0866 0.0583 0.0803 
 
(1.24) (1.24) (1.20) (1.19) (0.69) (0.96) 
state characteristic 0.0277** 0.0278** 0.0255** 0.0254* 0.0251* 0.0253* 
 
(2.14) (2.14) (1.97) (1.95) (1.82) (1.83) 
relative size -0.0443 -0.0430 -0.0382 -0.0389 -0.0769 -0.0435 
 
(-1.07) (-1.03) (-0.94) (-0.95) (-1.31) (-0.97) 
DIF reserve ratio -0.0399 0.0398 0.0323 -0.0324 0.0052 0.0083 
 
0.52) (0.52 (0.42) (0.42) (0.06) (0.10) 
pre_roa_onequarter 0.0109 
     
 
(0.27) 
     pre_roe_onequarter 
 
-0.0004 
    
  
(-0.13) 
    pre_roa_halfyear 
  
0.0146 
   
   
(0.56) 
   pre_roe_halfyear 
   
0.0008 
  
    
(0.45) 
  pre_roa_oneyear 
    
0.0362 
 
     
(1.34) 
 pre_roe_oneyear 
     
0.0008 
      
(0.37) 
Constant 0.4884*** 0.2385*** -0.4762*** -0.4741*** -0.4753*** -0.4887*** 
 
(-3.88) (3.87) (-3.78) (-3.76) (-3.58) (-3.64) 
       Observations 297 297 295 295 288 288 
sigma 0.2377 0.2385 0.2374 0.2379 0.2491 0.2511 
Pseudo R2 0.0477 0.0474 0.0447 0.0439 0.0518 0.0392 
Prob>chi2 0.2330 0.2372 0.2781 0.2885 0.2088 0.3667 
 
Table C.9 presents the Tobit regression estimates of determinants of BPG/TL for the non-FDIC-assisted 
mergers. Number of bids is not included in the independent variable list due to lack of information. The 
independent variables are defined in the Appendix A: Data Definitions. T-statistics are listed below each 
coefficient in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.10 
Effect of Discount on Post-Merger Profitability Change of Acquirers 
Panel A: Post-Merger ROA Change 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLE
S 
post_roa_onequa
rter 
post_roa_onequa
rter 
post_roa_halfy
ear 
post_roa_halfy
ear 
post_roa_oney
ear 
post_roa_oney
ear 
              
a_size -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015** -0.0014* -0.0011* -0.0010* 
 
(-2.977) (-2.902) (-2.019) (-1.843) (-1.796) (-1.689) 
a_ci 0.0057** 0.0062** 0.0096*** 0.0100*** 0.0084** 0.0086** 
 
(2.207) (2.312) (3.385) (3.436) (2.466) (2.576) 
a_im -0.0229 -0.0144 0.0044 0.0109 -0.0182 -0.0144 
 
(-0.612) (-0.384) (0.083) (0.218) (-0.387) (-0.325) 
a_eqr 0.0213 0.0223 0.0039 0.0061 0.0266 0.0288 
 
(1.280) (1.250) (0.196) (0.296) (0.882) (0.923) 
a_npl 0.0808 0.0665 -0.0899 -0.1045 0.0548 0.0439 
 
(1.221) (1.060) (-0.702) (-0.789) (0.822) (0.684) 
a_lqr -0.0085 -0.0086 -0.0062 -0.0064 -0.0020 -0.0023 
 
(-1.505) (-1.461) (-0.876) (-0.922) (-0.278) (-0.311) 
discount
1 0.0271** 
 
0.0349** 
 
0.0295* 
 
 
(2.452) 
 
(2.394) 
 
(1.716) 
 discount
2 
 
0.0211* 
 
0.0303** 
 
0.0268 
  
(1.978) 
 
(2.085) 
 
(1.635) 
Constant 0.0171* 0.0160* 0.0137 0.0118 0.0055 0.0036 
 
(1.821) (1.729) (1.054) (0.875) (0.502) (0.337) 
       N 99 99 99 99 99 99 
Adjusted 
R2 0.381 0.344 0.340 0.320 0.346 0.334 
F-test 
(Prob>F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
 
Panel A of Table C.10 provides the OLS regression estimates of post-merger ROA change for different time periods 
(one quarter, half year and one year). The results are based on sub-sample. The independent variables are defined in 
the Appendix A: Data Definitions. Robust t-statistics are listed below each coefficient in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.10 (Continued) 
Panel B: Post-Merger ROE Change 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABL
ES 
post_roe_onequa
rter 
post_roe_onequa
rter 
post_roe_half
year 
post_roe_half
year 
post_roe_oney
ear 
post_roe_oney
ear 
              
a_size -0.0167*** -0.0163*** -0.0155** -0.0145** -0.0107** -0.0100* 
 
(-3.410) (-3.319) (-2.230) (-2.029) (-2.031) (-1.930) 
a_ci -0.0449** -0.0422** -0.0074 -0.0062 -0.0238 -0.0226 
 
(-2.211) (-2.072) (-0.315) (-0.267) (-0.786) (-0.767) 
a_im -0.3156 -0.2658 0.0228 0.0518 -0.3000 -0.2720 
 
(-0.912) (-0.774) (0.049) (0.116) (-0.959) (-0.925) 
a_eqr -0.0593 -0.0507 -0.1839 -0.1639 0.0187 0.0349 
 
(-0.522) (-0.452) (-1.205) (-1.109) (0.162) (0.293) 
a_npl 0.5948 0.5046 -1.5720 -1.6631 0.2826 0.2026 
 
(1.006) (0.878) (-1.149) (-1.188) (0.457) (0.337) 
a_lqr -0.0244 -0.0250 -0.0251 -0.0274 0.0144 0.0126 
 
(-0.455) (-0.460) (-0.447) (-0.509) (0.334) (0.291) 
discount1 0.1827** 
 
0.2569** 
 
0.2167 
 
 
(2.172) 
 
(2.153) 
 
(1.388) 
 
discount2 
 
0.1478* 
 
0.2364* 
 
0.1969 
  
(1.833) 
 
(1.973) 
 
(1.324) 
Constant 0.3066*** 0.2985*** 0.2635** 0.2464* 0.1745* 0.1606* 
 
(3.589) (3.513) (2.129) (1.914) (1.779) (1.692) 
       
N 99 99 99 99 99 99 
Adjusted 
R2 0.208 0.185 0.276 0.267 0.173 0.160 
F-test 
(Prob>F) 0.0223 0.0323 0.0005 0.0008 0.1106 0.1009 
 
Panel B of Table C.10 provides the OLS regression estimates of post-merger ROE change for different time periods 
(one quarter, half year and one year). The results are based on sub-sample. The independent variables are defined in 
the Appendix A: Data Definitions. Robust t-statistics are listed below each coefficient in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.11 
Factors Influencing Discount – Robustness Test 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES discount1 discount1 discount2 discount2 
          
same city 0.0285** 0.0270* 0.0091 0.0087 
 
(2.195) (1.832) (0.449) (0.415) 
state characteristic 0.0012 0.0011 0.0028 0.0029 
 
(0.309) (0.294) (0.599) (0.613) 
number of bids -0.0039** -0.0039** -0.0044** -0.0045** 
 
(-2.183) (-2.151) (-2.312) (-2.354) 
DIF reserve ratio -0.0084 -0.0097 -0.0291 -0.0330 
 
(-0.242) (-0.269) (-0.755) (-0.844) 
relative size 0.0065*** 0.0066*** 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 
 
(3.238) (3.135) (2.988) (2.920) 
lsa -0.1208*** 
 
-0.1019***  
 
(-5.452) 
 
(-4.157)  
lsa/tl 
 
-0.1498***  -0.1326*** 
  
(-4.948)  (-4.154) 
Constant 0.2159*** 0.2117*** 0.2133*** 0.2110*** 
 
(6.983) (6.817) (5.518) (5.499) 
   
  
Observations 121 121 121 121 
R-squared 0.2882 0.2625 0.1904 0.1873 
F-test (Prob>F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Table C.11 provides the OLS regression estimates of discount1 and discount2 
based on the full sample. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix 
A: Data Definitions. Robust t-statistics are listed below each coefficient in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.12 
Factors Influencing Bargain Purchase Gains for the FDIC-Assisted Mergers – Robustness Test 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES bpg/tl bpg/tl bpg/tl bpg/tl bpg/tl bpg/tl 
              
number of bids -0.0056** -0.0058** -0.0055** -0.0055** -0.0054** -0.0054** 
 
(-2.489) (-2.587) (-2.457) (-2.499) (-2.408) (-2.407) 
same city -0.0046 -0.0047 -0.0094 -0.0057 -0.0046 -0.0055 
 
(-0.126) (-0.131) (-0.256) (-0.156) (-0.124) (-0.147) 
state characteristic -0.0022 -0.0028 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0020 -0.0020 
 
(-0.424) (-0.542) (-0.301) (-0.265) (-0.393) (-0.383) 
relative size -0.0034 -0.0042 -0.0024 -0.0038 -0.0038 -0.0041 
 
(-0.695) (-0.888) (-0.486) (-0.820) (-0.771) (-0.877) 
DIF reserve ratio 0.0473 0.0467 0.0467 0.0481 0.0467 0.0464 
 
(1.207) (1.200) (1.195) (1.239) (1.181) (1.179) 
pre_roa_onequarter 1.0527 
     
 
(0.708) 
     pre_roe_onequarter 
 
0.2343 
    
  
(1.308) 
    pre_roa_halfyear 
  
1.5011 
   
   
(1.106) 
   pre_roe_halfyear 
   
0.2275 
  
    
(1.503) 
  pre_roa_oneyear 
    
0.2853 
 
     
(0.237) 
 pre_roe_oneyear 
     
0.0487 
      
(0.359) 
Constant 0.1175** 0.1246** 0.1104** 0.1092** 0.1147** 0.1145** 
 
(2.334) (2.467) (2.204) (2.190) (2.280) (2.281) 
       Observations 115 115 115 115 115 115 
sigma 0.1686 0.1670 0.1675 0.1664 0.1690 0.1690 
Pseudo R2 0.3329 0.4073 0.3686 0.3989 0.3094 0.3126 
Prob>chi2 0.0553 0.0197 0.0340 0.0222 0.0755 0.0724 
 
Table C.12 provides the Tobit regression estimates of determinants of BPG/TL reported by the assisted acquirers, 
based on the full sample. The independent variables are defined in the Appendix A: Data Definitions. Robust t-
statistics are listed below each coefficient in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.13 
Effect of Discount on Post-Merger Profitability Change of Acquirers – Robustness Test 
Panel A: Post-Merger ROA Change 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABL
ES 
post_roa_onequa
rter 
post_roa_halfy
ear 
post_roa_oney
ear 
post_roa_onequa
rter 
post_roa_halfy
ear 
post_roa_oney
ear 
              
a_size -0.0015*** -0.0014* -0.0011* -0.0014*** -0.0013* -0.0010* 
 
(-2.897) (-1.890) (-1.797) (-2.821) (-1.703) (-1.683) 
a_ci 0.0058** 0.0098*** 0.0084** 0.0063** 0.0102*** 0.0086** 
 
(2.271) (3.446) (2.462) (2.393) (3.526) (2.577) 
a_im -0.0235 0.0033 -0.0182 -0.0150 0.0099 -0.0144 
 
(-0.630) (0.064) (-0.386) (-0.402) (0.199) (-0.325) 
a_eqr 0.0205 0.0027 0.0267 0.0215 0.0048 0.0288 
 
(1.251) (0.137) (0.891) (1.218) (0.236) (0.930) 
a_npl 0.0925 -0.0710 0.0535 0.0796 -0.0842 0.0439 
 
(1.512) (-0.591) (0.872) (1.356) (-0.674) (0.744) 
a_lqr -0.0086 -0.0063 -0.0020 -0.0087 -0.0065 -0.0023 
 
(-1.525) (-0.896) (-0.276) (-1.484) (-0.945) (-0.310) 
discount1 0.0273** 0.0353** 0.0295* 
   
 
(2.474) (2.380) (1.715) 
   
discount2 
   
0.0213** 0.0306** 0.0268 
    
(1.989) (2.066) (1.635) 
Constant 0.0165* 0.0128 0.0055 0.0154* 0.0108 0.0036 
 
(1.761) (0.962) (0.505) (1.662) (0.780) (0.336) 
       
N 100 100 100 100 100 100 
R-squared 0.379 0.337 0.347 0.340 0.316 0.335 
 
Panel A of Table C.13 provides the OLS regression estimates of post-merger ROA change for different time periods 
(one quarter, half year and one year). The results are based on full sample. The independent variables are defined in 
the Appendix A: Data Definitions. Robust t-statistics are listed below each coefficient in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.13 (Continued) 
Panel B: Post-Merger ROE Change 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABL
ES 
post_roe_onequa
rter 
post_roe_halfy
ear 
post_roe_oney
ear 
post_roe_onequa
rter 
post_roe_halfy
ear 
post_roe_oney
ear 
              
a_size -0.0163*** -0.0147** -0.0108** -0.0158*** -0.0137* -0.0100* 
 
(-3.308) (-2.037) (-2.014) (-3.214) (-1.831) (-1.909) 
a_ci -0.0435** -0.0050 -0.0240 -0.0407** -0.0037 -0.0227 
 
(-2.131) (-0.214) (-0.792) (-1.991) (-0.157) (-0.771) 
a_im -0.3234 0.0096 -0.2989 -0.2730 0.0398 -0.2715 
 
(-0.932) (0.020) (-0.959) (-0.793) (0.090) (-0.924) 
a_eqr -0.0683 -0.1993 0.0200 -0.0604 -0.1799 0.0356 
 
(-0.609) (-1.310) (0.176) (-0.544) (-1.231) (0.303) 
a_npl 0.7368 -1.3303 0.2618 0.6552 -1.4130 0.1916 
 
(1.322) (-1.025) (0.463) (1.196) (-1.059) (0.349) 
a_lqr -0.0255 -0.0270 0.0146 -0.0262 -0.0294 0.0127 
 
(-0.477) (-0.479) (0.337) (-0.484) (-0.545) (0.292) 
discount1 0.1855** 0.2617** 0.2163 
   
 
(2.205) (2.117) (1.386) 
   
discount2 
   
0.1500* 0.2401* 0.1967 
    
(1.851) (1.934) (1.322) 
Constant 0.3000*** 0.2522* 0.1755* 0.2913*** 0.2344* 0.1611* 
 
(3.499) (1.959) (1.772) (3.418) (1.742) (1.683) 
       
N 100 100 100 100 100 100 
R-squared 0.204 0.267 0.175 0.180 0.258 0.163 
 
Panel B of Table C.13 provides the OLS regression estimates of post-merger ROE change for different time periods 
(one quarter, half year and one year). The results are based on full sample. The independent variables are defined in 
the Appendix A: Data Definitions. Robust t-statistics are listed below each coefficient in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.14 
Factors Influencing Discount – Robustness Test 2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES discount1 discount1 discount2 discount2 
same city 0.0421*** 0.0435*** 
  
 
(3.196) (3.095) 
  same state 
  
-0.0423 -0.0355 
   
(-1.450) (-1.196) 
state 
characteristic -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0013 0.0006 
 
(-0.031) (-0.140) (0.230) (0.109) 
pre_roa_halfyear 0.5536 0.7824 0.4964 0.7464 
 
(0.429) (0.603) (0.379) (0.559) 
number of bids -0.0038** -0.0040** -0.0051** -0.0052** 
 
(-2.012) (-2.033) (-2.446) (-2.543) 
DIF reserve ratio -0.0236 -0.0247 -0.0502 -0.0514 
 
(-0.593) (-0.602) (-1.181) (-1.177) 
relative size 0.0063 -0.0017 0.0226 0.0147 
 
(0.288) (-0.072) (0.813) (0.508) 
lsa -0.1190*** 
 
-0.1092*** 
 
 
(-4.953) 
 
(-4.244) 
 lsa/tl 
 
-0.1454*** 
 
-0.1348*** 
  
(-4.495) 
 
(-3.976) 
Constant 0.2243*** 0.2278*** 0.2579*** 0.2582*** 
 
(6.046) (5.789) (6.108) (5.912) 
     Observations 96 96 96 96 
F-test (Prob>F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0009 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.191 0.164 0.155 0.140 
Table C.14 provides the OLS regression estimates of discount1 and discount2 after we 
exclude extreme cases in which the relative size is larger than or equal to two. The 
independent variables are defined in the Appendix A: Data Definitions. Robust t-statistics 
are listed below each coefficient in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.15 
Factors Influencing Discount – Robustness Test 3 
Panel A: 2009Q4 to 2010Q4 Results 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES discount1 discount1 discount1 discount3 discount3 discount3 
same city 0.0380* 
 
0.0470* 0.0132 
 
0.0231 
 
(1.989) 
 
(1.885) (0.399) 
 
(0.657) 
same state 
 
-0.0057 
  
-0.0383 
 
  
(-0.198) 
  
(-0.842) 
 state 
characteristic 0.0065 0.0072 0.0061 0.0050 0.0063 0.0050 
 
(1.360) (1.458) (1.103) (0.760) (0.947) (0.702) 
pre_roa_halfyear 0.2361 -0.0401 0.2551 0.4887 -0.2317 0.5752 
 
(0.170) (-0.026) (0.165) (0.297) (-0.125) (0.313) 
number of bids -0.0118** -0.0124*** -0.0109** -0.0169*** -0.0169*** -0.0162*** 
 
(-2.531) (-2.737) (-2.420) (-2.885) (-2.984) (-2.938) 
DIF reserve ratio -0.1525 -0.1463 -0.1541 -0.1361 -0.1749 -0.1415 
 
(-1.363) (-1.227) (-1.290) (-0.898) (-1.227) (-0.943) 
relative size -0.0152 -0.0156 -0.0202 0.0051 0.0057 -0.0002 
 
(-0.566) (-0.557) (-0.661) (0.125) (0.139) (-0.005) 
lsa -0.1689*** -0.1661*** 
 
-0.1572*** -0.1547*** 
 
 
(-5.818) (-5.870) 
 
(-4.034) (-4.262) 
 lsa/tl 
  
-0.2027*** 
  
-0.1997*** 
   
(-5.289) 
  
(-4.264) 
Constant 0.1885*** 0.1936*** 0.1804*** 0.2398*** 0.2463*** 0.2344*** 
 
(5.043) (5.095) (4.232) (4.408) (4.237) (3.993) 
       Observations 45 45 45 45 45 45 
F-test (Prob > F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0004 0.0000 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.481 0.465 0.417 0.319 0.334 0.318 
Table C.15 provides the OLS regression estimates of discount1 and discount2 after we exclude cases in which 
the relative size is larger than or equal to two and split the sample into two according to the DIF reserve ratio 
variation. Panel A shows the results for the first half period, 2009Q4 to 2010Q4. The independent variables are 
defined in the Appendix A: Data Definitions. Robust t-statistics are listed below each coefficient in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.15 (continued) 
Factors Influencing Discount – Robustness Test 3 
Panel B: 2011Q1 to 2013Q1 Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES discount1 discount1 discount1 discount3 discount3 discount3 
same city 0.0348 
 
0.0257 0.0264 
 
0.0182 
 
(1.257) 
 
(0.907) (0.919) 
 
(0.621) 
same state 
 
-0.0462 
  
-0.0453* 
 
  
(-1.623) 
  
(-1.690) 
 state characteristic -0.0111 -0.0089 -0.0127 -0.0105 -0.0083 -0.0118 
 
(-1.291) (-0.988) (-1.444) (-1.236) (-0.980) (-1.373) 
pre_roa_halfyear 1.1793 1.8727 1.7497 0.9173 1.4934 1.4413 
 
(0.452) (0.785) (0.688) (0.381) (0.674) (0.612) 
number of bids -0.0033 -0.0034 -0.0035 -0.0033 -0.0035* -0.0035 
 
(-1.500) (-1.649) (-1.565) (-1.589) (-1.789) (-1.643) 
DIF reserve ratio -0.1176 -0.1377 -0.1240 -0.1093 -0.1288 -0.1146 
 
(-1.186) (-1.481) (-1.227) (-1.151) (-1.434) (-1.184) 
relative size -0.0071 0.0050 -0.0213 -0.0186 -0.0064 -0.0317 
 
(-0.197) (0.128) (-0.575) (-0.529) (-0.171) (-0.870) 
lsa -0.0850** -0.0896*** 
 
-0.0761** -0.0808*** 
 
 
(-2.677) (-2.889) 
 
(-2.520) (-2.781) 
 lsa/tl 
  
-0.1034** 
  
-0.0913** 
   
(-2.494) 
  
(-2.327) 
Constant 0.3341*** 0.3549*** 0.3512*** 0.3318*** 0.3523*** 0.3466*** 
 
(3.797) (4.181) (3.778) (3.862) (4.381) (3.830) 
       Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 
F-test (Prob > F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0041 0.0015 0.0104 
Adjusted R-squared 0.020 0.039 0.007 0.004 0.025 -0.009 
 
Table C.15 provides the OLS regression estimates of discount1 and discount2 after we exclude cases in which 
the relative size is larger than or equal to two and split the sample into two according to the DIF reserve ratio 
variation. Panel B shows the results for the second half period, 2011Q1 to 2013Q1. The independent 
variables are defined in the Appendix A: Data Definitions. Robust t-statistics are listed below each 
coefficient in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.16 
Factors Influencing Bargain Purchase Gains for the FDIC-Assisted Mergers – 
Robustness Test 3 
  2009Q4 to 2010Q4 2011Q1 to 2013Q1 
VARIABLES bpg/tl bpg/tl bpg/tl bpg/tl 
1.same city -0.0272 
 
-0.0065 
 
 
(-0.436) 
 
(-0.061) 
 1.same state 
 
-0.0006 
 
-0.0409 
  
(-0.011) 
 
(-0.674) 
state characteristic -0.0066 -0.0072 -0.0082 -0.0065 
 
(-0.697) (-0.743) (-0.472) (-0.372) 
pre_roa_onequarter 3.9935 4.0864 3.1768 3.8028 
 
(1.159) (1.180) (0.594) (0.699) 
number of bids -0.0268** -0.0265** -0.0096** -0.0105** 
 
(-2.582) (-2.537) (-2.089) (-2.177) 
DIF reserve ratio -0.0945 -0.1049 -0.2322* -0.2473* 
 
(-0.485) (-0.510) (-1.739) (-1.833) 
relative size 0.0585 0.0595 -0.0098 -0.0003 
 
(0.906) (0.917) (-0.115) (-0.004) 
lsa/tl 0.0477 0.0433 -0.1087 -0.1123 
 
(0.735) (0.674) (-1.552) (-1.606) 
Constant 0.0887 0.0889 0.2758 0.2985 
 
(0.817) (0.816) (1.557) (1.673) 
     Observations 45 45 51 51 
sigma 0.1274*** 0.1279*** 0.1564*** 0.1558*** 
Pseudo R2 3.6028 3.544 2.5036 2.6227 
Prob>chi2 0.1133 0.1205 0.2208 0.1932 
 
Table C.16 provides the Tobit regression estimates of determinants of BPG/TL after we 
exclude cases in which the relative size is larger than or equal to two and split the sample into 
two according to the DIF reserve ratio variation.. The independent variables are defined in 
the Appendix A: Data Definitions. Robust t-statistics are listed below each coefficient in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
